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Abstract 
Abortion and the Jewish Ethical Tradition: 
Is There a Single Authentic Position 
Larry V. Amsel 
1988 
The last decade has seen a significant increase in the 
publishing of English language texts and articles on Jewish 
bioethics. On the question of abortion in the Halakha, Jewish 
religious law, many authors take a stringent position. They 
allow abortion only in cases of serious medical danger to the 
mother. Moreover, these authors claim that their position 
correlates with a strict interpretation of the Halakha. 
Articles critical of this position have begun to appear. We 
review the literature and find that the stringent position is 
not correlated simply to a strict interpretation of Jewish law, 
but rather to a systematic bias in interpreting and applying 
that law. Possible sources of this bias are found in 1) the 
methodology of interpretation 2) ethical and theological 
assumptions which do not necessarily represent an authentic 
Jewish viewpoint and 3) the institutional forces that condition 
contemporary Rabbinic decision making. We conclude that what 
is relevant to the debate on abortion is the dialectic method 
of Halakha which is based on comparing new situations with 
century old conclusions. There is no broad ethical framwork. 
Instead, the ethics of the Halakha are contained in an ongoing 
discussion of its cases. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Section 1. Background 
A. Theology in Bioethics 
Our starting point for this paper is the question: What 
contribution can the Jewish religious law make to the 
contemporary abortion discussion? We might wonder first: what 
role should any religious thought play in contemporary 
formulations of bioethics. 
In calling for an increased dialogue between secular 
bioethics and theology E. E. Shelp^ points out that often 
there is a religious or theological basis for our positions in 
bioethics. We often ignore this, however, either because we 
believe ourselves to be totally rational secularists, or if we 
acknowledge the religious component of our thinking we fail to 
develop these ideas: 
in an effort to be persuasive on such grounds as 
diverse persons can agree upon; often to introduce 
theology becomes [we fear] a reason for one's secular 
colleagues to discount what one might say about 
medical ethics.2 
Regardless of our position it becomes important to excavate 
the religious-theological components of our thinking. If we 
are professedly religious we need to be honest with ourselves 
and our colleagues on how this affects our views of bioethics. 
If on the other hand we claim to be secularists it is perhaps 
even more important to examine our premises and recognize how 
strongly influenced our moral thinking is by specifically 

religious categories. It is from this latter position that 
this paper is written. 
2 
The philosopher MacIntyre has identified three tasks along 
the road to the above goal: 
First ... a clear statement of what difference it 
makes to be a Jew or a Christian or a Moslem rather 
than a secular thinker in morality generally. 
Secondly ... a theological critique of secular 
morality and culture ... Third [to clarify] what 
bearing this has ... on specific problems which arise 
from modern medicine.3 
We will touch on each of these points as we move through 
this paper. The kind of issues that are raised in medical 
ethics in general and the abortion debate in particular do not 
seem to be solvable by the science of medicine nor we believe 
by the study of a secular ethics. For they touch on the 
meaning and value we attach to the very fact of our existence, 
the fears we attach to end of our existence and the eternity we 
experience in our encounter with others in the same 
predicament. It is this that makes these issues so disturbing 
in a secular world. If we ignore religion the issues resurface 
in the guise of medicine. The point we believe is that one can 
have secular answers but one can’t avoid asking religious 
questions. 
We also agree with MacIntyre that it is important to 
examine these issues from specific religious perspectives. In 
the abortion controversy especially there has often been a 
melding together in the interest of "gathering the troops" to 
support this side or that. Pronouncements are made by 
interfaith groups that may help promote one side of the debate 

3 
or the other but do little to educate us about what the 
particular traditions have had to say on the issue. We need 
the multiplicity of different views and we especially need to 
preserve the history of each tradition's struggle with these 
issues. We are not the first generation to wonder. 
In this paper we hope to contribute to this task from the 
specific perspective of traditional Jewish law - the Halakha. 
Referring to the abortion controversy the religious scholar G. 
B. Halibard has written: 
It is probable that this type of problem is ultimately 
soluble only by reference to ethical and religious 
criteria. If so the Halakha is peculiarly fit to give 
guidance since it is a fully developed legal system 
with binding and persuasive precedents but interpreted 
by Ecclesiastics with constant application of moral 
consideration. 
Returning to our original question then, we hope to shed 
some light on the methods and content of the Jewish religious 
law concerning abortion. In particular we will attempt to 
refute what we believe has been a misrepresentation of this 
tradition. First we need to establish some background. 
B. Halakha - The Traditional Jewish Law 
It is certainly not possible to present a "Jewish" view of 
abortion as the Jewish community is extremely diverse. There 
are four branches of Judaism: orthodox, conservative, reform 
and reconstructionists; and more divisions within each of these 
main branches. We will focus our interest, however, on the 
"Halakha," the traditional and normative body of Jewish law. 
This is based on the Five Books of Moses as understood and 
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interpreted by the Talmud. The Talmud consists in the 
redaction of what had been a thousand year tradition of "oral 
law" consisting in turn of interpretations of the Biblical 
texts and a broad legal system covering the whole gamut of 
religious, commercial, family and social law. The Halakhic 
tradition continues after the redaction of the Talmud with the 
publishing of several codes of Jewish law, huge tomes which 
attempt to organize the entire legal corpus. Finally and 
perhaps most importantly are the Responsa or Rabbinical 
decisions. These are legal opinions written in response to 
specific cases or questions presented to Rabbinical 
authorities. This can be viewed as the equivalent of "case 
law" in American jurisprudence. The Responsa literature 
continues to grow to the present day. 
We focus on the Halakha because as the philosopher Ronald 
Green has written, it "forms the substance of any 
5 
self-confessedly 'Jewish1 point of view." Similarly, the 
Judaic scholar Robert Gordis whose views are anything but 
traditional has written: 
No serious discussion on the nature of Judaism or of 
its experience in the past, its condition in the 
present or its prospects for the future can proceed 
very far without the introduction of the term 
Halakha. Derived from the Hebrew root Halakha "go, 
walk" it means "the way" and refers to the body of 
Jewish law and practice by which the Jewish people has 
been governed during its pilgrimage.^ 
Referring to MacIntyre's tasks, it is Halakha that is 
specific to the Jewish experience and makes the difference as 
to a uniquely Jewish view. 
The literature of Halakha has until recently been 
inaccessible to those untrained in its scholarship. It is 
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written in either Hebrew or Aramaic, its reasoning can be quite 
difficult and finally it is voluminous. The recent decade, 
however, has seen an explosion in English language texts and 
articles dealing with Jewish law and in particular with Halakha 
and bioethics. It will therefore become possible for concepts 
and methods of the Halakha to enter into dialogue with other 
ethical and theological positions. In particular it becomes 
possible to do the kind of scholarship involved in this paper. 
While every branch of Judaism looks upon the Halakha with 
great respect and as a source of moral inspiration, different 
groups accept its authority as the normative and binding 
religious law to a varying degree. Thus the orthodox accept 
Halakha as divine and binding while the reform and 
reconstructionist see it more in historical terms as the early 
source for their present beliefs. The conservative movement 
tends to fall between these extremes. 
In many areas of religious observance, for example, dietary 
proscriptions or observance of the Sabbath, the orthodox 
movement and especially the ultra-orthodox sects will 
rightfully claim what I wish to call the correlation 
hypothesis. That is that the stringency of their views and 
practice concerning these laws are directlv correlated with the 
strictness of their interpretation of and adherence to the 
classical Halakha. An orthodox person who refuses to use 
electricity on Sabbath or who will not drink milk which has not 
been certified kosher can very legitimately cite Halakhic texts 
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to prove that his belief and practice are closer to the 
traditional law than his conservative or reform compatriots. 
This claim, however, has also been made with regard to 
abortion. In an issue as complex as abortion, however, the 
Halakha simply does not present a monolithic and consistent 
view. Nonetheless, the correlation claim has been articulated 
forcefully and is widely believed in a simplified form: the 
more authentically traditional one is the more restrictive on 
abortion they will be. It will be the major task, of this paper 
to refute this claim. 
Section 2. Plan of the Work - Evidence and Arguments 
A. The Stringent Orthodox Position and the Correlation Claim 
As we will demonstrate throughout this paper, the question 
of abortion in the classical Halakhic literature is very 
complex and controversial, probably reflecting highly 
polarized positions dating back fifteen centuries. However, 
within the recent expansion of English language papers on 
Jewish bioethics, a stringent position has dominated the 
discussion on abortion. In examining the literature one is 
most likely to first encounter this view. This stringent 
position permits abortion only in cases of serious danger to 
the mother's life. 
Moreover these authors have insisted that their position is 
the only "authentic” Jewish view. They have bolstered this 
view by claiming that the stringency of their position 
correlates directly with a strict and legalistic reading of 
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Halakha and with an adherence to that Halakha. Any more 
lenient position is accused of representing a divergence from 
strict Halakhic rule. We will show that these claims are 
unsubstantiated. That the stringent position correlates rather 
with a systematic bias in interpreting and applying the 
Halakhic rulings on abortion and the fetus. We will attempt to 
discover the source of that bias in 1) the methodology of 
interpretation, 2) ethical and theological assumptions which do 
not necessarily represent the only Jewish viewpoint and 3) 
institutional forces that condition contemporary Rabbinic 
decision making. 
It is our view that the more lenient positions within the 
current discussion have a wealth of classical Halakhic material 
on which to base their view and that their position is 
consistent with the “authentic" tradition. 
B. Evidence and Arguments - A Critique of the Stringent 
Position 
We will show that the correlation claim in untenable by 
using several lines of evidence. Simultaneously we will 
attempt to understand the source of the bias by examining the 
stringent camp’s method of interpretation and its underlying 
assumptions. 
1. The Early Halakhic Sources 
In Chapter II we briefly review the early Halakhic sources 
on abortion and demonstrate that there is a wide ranging and 
diverse set of ideas rather than a single authoritative 
position. We discuss evidence that an early rift of opinion 
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existed in the Talmudic period. We note that both Biblical and 
Talmudic sources tend to regard the fetus as having 
significantly less status than its mother or other persons. 
Finally, we find no clear Biblical or Talmudic prohibition of 
abortion. 
2. Contemporary Interpretations 
In Chapter III we consider contemporary Jewish religious 
writing on abortion. We notice that we can divide the field of 
opinion along two different axis. On one axis we consider the 
author’s view of abortion from very restrictive at one end to 
very permissive on the other. Along the other axis we consider 
an author's view of whether Halakha is binding and normative. 
Again at one end we get very strictly adhering authors on the 
other end those who are not bound by Halakha. What is 
instructive is that these axis do not run parallel as the 
correlation claim would lead us to expect. Rather they are 
orthogonal. That is they divide the field into four 
quadrants. We actually find the following: 1) The stringent 
orthodox camp - restrictive on abortion and claim this position 
by virtue of adherence to Halakha which restricts abortion, 2) 
permissive authors who hold a lenient position on abortion 
despite their view that Halakha is restrictive on abortion. 
This group does not consider Halakha binding. This is the 
group that the stringent position contrasts itself with and 
presents as evidence of the correlation claim. 
There are two other groups, however, whose existence is 
inconsistent with the correlation hypothesis. 3) Authors with 
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a permissive stance on abortion who consider Halakha binding 
and base their lenient views on their reading of Halakha. 4) 
These authors are very stringent and disallow abortion except 
to save the mother's life. They hold this position despite 
their interpretation of Halakha as essentially permitting 
abortion. They reject the permissive Halakha in favor of a 
strong personal moral objection to abortion. 
Groups (3) and (4) are unexpected if the correlation claim 
were strictly true. Though this is not decisive evidence 
against the claim, it does indicate that reasonable scholars 
can disagree as to the sense of the Halakhic ruling on 
abortion. It also demonstrates that these differences of 
opinion the interpretation of the Halakha do not depend on an 
author’s position on abortion. 
3. The Stringent Position and Legal Absolutism 
In Chapter IV we examine the stringent orthodox 
understanding of its own interpretive method. We wish to 
understand how this position arrived at its conclusions about 
abortion and Halakha given the multiplicity of possible 
interpretations of this material. As a first step, we need to 
understand how the stringent camp views Halakha and its own 
exegetical methods. 
We will find that the stringent orthodox position views 
Halakha as monolithic, absolute, consistent, divine and 
unchanging. These authors see their own method for 
interpreting the Halakha as a purely legalistic and technical 
function. They claim that philosophical or theological 

10 
speculation are not used or relevant to the legislative 
adjudication of Halakhic rulings. Indeed, a superficial 
reading of some of the contemporary Halakhic discussions seems 
to corroborate this. Proof text citation and reliance on 
authority seem at times to dominate the discussion and replace 
ethical argumentation. We hope to show that this impression is 
mistaken. To uncover the deeper philosophical structure that 
motivates the proof text arguments. 
Having placed the stringent orthodox position in the larger 
context of its views on Halakha and Halakhic exegesis, we can 
now begin to formulate an organized critique. 
4. Cordozo and his Legal Framework 
In Chapter V we will present a new approach toward an 
understanding and critique of the stringent orthodox position. 
This approach is based on taking a serious look at the 
stringent positions claim that its method is legalistic. We 
subject this position to a legal critique borrowed from 
Benjamin Cordozo's theory of the nature of judicial process. 
According to Cordozo, there is no such thing as a simple 
legal method. In the process of deciding a legal issue, one 
must select precedent cases and extract their operative 
principle, only then can one apply this principle to the case 
at hand. Cordozo argues that in each step of this task, bias 
is inevitably introduced. Choosing which cases to consider as 
precedents is largely a subjective act and will be influenced 
by one's underlying philosophical biases. Extracting the 
principle from a given precedent inevitably involves 
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abstracting and generalizing from the particular to the 
universal. Cordozo points out that this can take place in many 
equally logical ways and a justice [read Halakhist] must choose 
among them on the basis of some extra legal, extra logical 
preferences. Even when the principle has been cleanly 
abstracted from the case material, the task is "only half 
done." For in applying the principle, there are many factors 
that might determine the mode and direction of its 
progression. Cordozo classifies these factors as logical, 
historical, traditional and sociological. In each case, 
choices need to be made and a justice will make these choices 
on the basis of his underlying belief system and his hopes and 
goals for society. Thus, every justice becomes a legislator. 
Cordozo’s analysis is a tour de force which demonstrates that 
more naive theories about the judicial process do not hold up 
under scrutiny. 
We will borrow Cordozo's framework because its critique 
fits the stringent orthodox camp so well and demonstrates that 
a more complex interpretive method is really in operation. 
5. A Critique of the Stringent Position 
In Chapter VI, we apply the framework we have borrowed from 
Cordozo to critique the stringent position. We begin by 
considering the most important Halakhic precedents relating to 
abortion. In every case, we will show the stringent position 
demonstrates a consistent and systematic bias in its selection, 
interpretation and application of precedent materials. 
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The evidence accumulates that the stringent position is not 
simply correlated with a strict but straight-forward 
interpretation of the Halakhic precedents, but rather with a 
very selective and biased interpretation. This throws the 
correlation claim into serious doubt. 
Once we have established that there is a systematic bias 
operating within the stringent position, we will attempt to 
discover its source. We will find possible sources in: 
1) philosophical theological assumptions and preconceptions 
that are extra-Halakhic and do not necessarily represent 
authentic Jewish viewpoints; 2) goals and aspirations that 
these authors would like to promote but which are not 
necessarily Halakhic. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter VII, we return to the question of what 
contribution the Halakhic discussion of abortion can make to 
the contemporary abortion debate. We review the results of the 
paper with this question as a focus. Several important 
contributions are considered. 

Chapter II 
Halakhic Sources 
Section 1. Overview of Halakhic Sources^" 
The supreme authority is the Torah. In its narrower sense, 
this means the Pentateuch (five books of Moses). In its 
broader sense, it encompasses all of the developed Jewish 
religious law. 
There is a conventional division between the written law 
(originally this included only the five books of Moses) and the 
oral law. The oral interpretation is in turn divisible into 
two essential forms: a) the Halakha is the law, the detailed 
and systematic application of the written and oral tradition to 
particular cases; b) the "aggadah" (narrative) is a compilation 
of moral maxims, legends, philosophical speculation. We will 
be less concerned with aggadah in this paper. 
Around the year 200 A.D., the oral law, too, was written 
down and became known as the Mishnah (The Manual of Study). As 
time went by, the Mishnah was the object of long and intense 
commentary and exposition. This constitutes the Gemarah or 
Talmud ("The Study"). An additional source of biblical 
interpretation was the Midrash (exposition), a large extra 
Talmudic collection. 
The Talmudic Period comprises a span of at least six 
centuries and was followed by post-talmudic codes. The most 
distinguished was written by Rashi (Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki, 
1040-1105). Around this time, in addition, emerged the 
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"Tosafor" (supplement), commentaries that are usually 
controversial proposing new solutions to previously studied 
problems. 
Maimonides (Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon, 1135-1204), the most 
famous Jew of the Middle Ages, produced the "Mishnah Torah” 
(second torah), a monumental code of Jewish law comprising all 
the Jewish laws in fourteen volumes totaling 1,000 chapters. 
After the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, Rabbi Joseph 
Karo had the genius necessary to reduce the existing codices to 
one code. It took him twenty years of work and twelve years of 
revision. He called it the Shulkon Arukh (The Set Table). 
Later authorities and present day rabbis have concentrated 
their efforts and thoughts in another body of literature, the 
"Responsa." These are formal replies to legal questions 
addressed to the scholars throughout generations. Many of the 
codifiers were also authors of responsa. A large proportion of 
the source material on abortion is based on the responsa 
literature. The attractiveness of this literature lies in the 
fact that each responsum is actually an essay rich in ethical 
propositions and therefore a vital facet of Jewish tradition. 
Section 2. The Old Testament and Its Rabbinical Interpretation 
A. Abortion as Tort 
The Bible speaks directly of abortion in only one instance 
and here it is an accidental abortion: 
When men fight and one of them pushes a pregnant woman 
and a miscarriage results but no other misfortune 
ensues, the penalty shall be fined according as the 
woman's husband may exact from him. But if other 
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misfortune ensues the penalty shall be life for life, 
eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for 
foot. [Exodus 21:22-24] 
As Feldman explains, this passage was interpreted and 
codified to exclude feticide from capital crime. The fetus is 
viewed as property in this instance, and feticide is not 
considered murder but rather a tort. This is clearly 
distinguished from the case of "other misfortune," i.e. death 
of the mother, where penalty shall be "life for life." 
On closer examination we can see that this Biblical passage 
distinguishes three categories of retribution. A simple 
monetary compensation for loss of property, a mutilation of 
equal severity for bodily wounds, and capital punishment for 
homicide. Within this scheme, the Bible places feticide 
squarely in the category of property damage. In fact, it 
assigns ownership of the fetus to the father and specifies that 
he is to be compensated for his loss monetarily. Perhaps we 
need be cautious in drawing too broad a principle since this is 
an accidental feticide. Nevertheless, it is telling that this 
is the only clear and direct Biblical reference to an induced 
abortion and the Bible treats it as a tort. 
B. "Nefesh Adam." The Breath of Life 
3 
Interestingly, the Talmud in Niddah 44b interprets 
another passage as a source of law on abortion. The passage 
reads simply "He that killeth any nefesh adam [human person] 
shall surely be put to death." [Gen. 9:6] The Talmud explains 
that the word "any" is intended to include an infant, while the 
words "nefesh adam" [human person] specifically exclude a 
fetus. For the fetus is not "nefesh adam" and its destruction 
V 
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is therefore not a capital crime. Although this interpretation 
at first seems forced, it is, in fact, understandable if we 
consider the context of the passage: 
And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord he shall 
surely be put to death and all the congregation shall 
certainly stone him. The stranger as well as he that 
is born in the land. When he blasphemeth the name of 
the Lord shall be put to death. And he that killeth 
any nefesh adam shall surely be put to death. And he 
that killeth a beast shall make it good; beast for 
beast. And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbor 
as he has done so shall it be done to him. Breath for 
breath, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. As he caused a 
blemish in a man so shall it be done to him again. 
And he that killeth a beast shall restore it and that 
killeth a nefesh adam he shall be put to death. Ye 
shall have one manner of law as well for the stranger 
as for the native for I am the Lord your God. 
[Leviticus 24:16-23] 
We find here the same three categories: property damage, 
mutilation, murder, as we had in the Exodus text. Notice the 
similarity of structure in the two passages. Perhaps the 
Talmud understands each in relation to the other. Within this 
system, the Talmud is placing feticide along with the killing 
of a beast as a crime recompensed only monetarily. 
Another important reason that the Talmud chooses to make 
this interpretation and exclude feticide from capital crime may 
have to do with the meanings of the words "nefesh adam." As we 
have indicated, most Jewish scholars translate this simply as 
4 
human person. 
In his dissertation on the use of words in the abortion 
debate, Stephen Dixon notes that "nefesh" is specifically 
associated with "breath" and "life."'* He cites the passages 
concerning the creation of man. The metaphor is of God's 
"breath of life" turning dust into "nefesh." [Gen. 2:7] The 
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implication of this particular life word is therefore 
understood by Dixon to place full human personhood at the 
moment of first breath. This notion is remarkably consistent 
with the Talmudic interpretation which places the moment of 
full personhood also at first breath, as we shall see later. 
Nevertheless, the implications of the specific word ,,nefeshM as 
referring to breathing are not expanded upon in the Jewish 
sources. 
C. Rabbi Yeshmael - A Divergent Opinion 
Another Biblical passage reads “He who sheds the blood of 
man by; man shall his blood be shed." [Gen 9:6] This text is 
the first Biblical source for capital punishment, and it 
establishes the right of a human court to exact the ultimate 
punishment. In this case the Talmud, in Sanhedrin 57b, quotes 
R. Yeshmael's rather forced, but grammatically possible, 
translation: “He who sheds the blood of man in man, his blood 
shall be shed." R. Yeshmael goes on to explain that "man in 
man" refers to the fetus and that feticide i§. a capital crime. 
Feldman^ comments that R. Yeshmael may have had an historic 
reason for "forcing" the above interpretation, namely, to 
condemn the Roman practice of his time. Nevertheless, this 
opinion has entered the Halakha. It is difficult to understand 
why the Talmud would interpret one passage as specifically 
excluding feticide from capital crime and another as 
specifically including feticide in that category. We will take 
this discrepancy as evidence that at least two inconsistent 
positions must have existed as far back as the Talmudic period 
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regarding the Jewish law on feticide. It is important to 
recall, however, that R. Yeshmael's evidence is a forced 
interpretation while the explicit Biblical reference to 
feticide considers it a tort. 
D. The Waters of Contention 
Another Biblical passage is interesting because it has 
been, for the most part, left out of the abortion discussion by 
Jewish scholars. It is mentioned, however, by the Biblical 
7 
scholar Jochle in a paper on the Mosaic Law and abortion. 
Jochle quotes Numbers 5:11-31. These passages deal with a 
suspicious husband who accuses his wife of adultery. The wife 
is taken to the priest who shall prepare a special drink of 
water, earth from the tabernacle, and the washed off letters of 
a scroll. The passage continues: 
He shall make the woman drink the water. If she has 
let herself become defiled and has been unfaithful to 
her husband, then she will suffer a miscarriage or 
untimely birth and her name be an example. [Num. 
5:25-31] 
Jochle points out that the above passage indicates that 
fetal life was not regarded by the Bible as valuable if 
conceived in adultery since its chemical abortion is secondary 
to establishing the mother’s guilt or innocence. It is rather 
surprising that we do not find this argument made in any Judaic 
discussion of abortion. It is possible that the supernatural 
nature of this trial by bitter waters removes it from the legal 
Halakhic discussion. Yet the question remains: How can we 
justify the death of even an illegitimate fetus if we believe 
that the fetus has an independent value or if we believe that 
there are duties which we owe any fetus? This passage would 
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seem to indicate that there are no such duties and that the 
fetus' life does not have an independent value. What is the 
justice of this miscarriage? 
E. The Seotuagint 
There is an alternate version of the first Biblical passage 
we mentioned concerning two men who are fighting. The 
Septuagint is a Greek translation of the Bible produced in 
O 
Alexandria. Feldman points out that in that translation the 
word "ason" is rendered "form" rather than "harm." The text 
then reads "if there is no form he shall be fined . . . But if 
there be form [to the miscarried fetus] then shalt thou give 
life for life." [Exodus 21:23] This mistranslation was thus 
understood to mean that if the woman were in early stages of 
pregnancy, before there is "form," then the man who pushed her 
pays monetary compensation. However, later in the pregnancy, 
once there is "form," the man is responsible with his life for 
the woman's miscarriage. This introduced a very different 
tradition into early church teachings. Thus Tertullian, 
accepting the Septuagint version, preached that feticide was 
murder. Later, Church Fathers accepted the original Hebrew 
text but continued in the belief that feticide was murder. 
From its very beginnings, Christianity takes away a 
different lesson from the Bible as to the status of the fetus 
and the criminality of abortion. In all likelihood, this 
mistranslation, like R. Yeshmael's strained interpretation, was 
no accident, but a reaction to Roman practice. 
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F. Conclusion 
Clearly there are many more sources in the Bible that deal 
with family life, procreation, and the pregnant state. 
However, only the few passages mentioned here deal directly 
with the fetus and have legally binding status in the Halakha. 
We see that, except for R. Yeshmael’s interpretation, all 
cited Biblical texts consider feticide in a separate category 
from homicide, and value the fetus not as an independent 
individual, but as property. 
Section 3. The Talmud and Early Authorities 
The Talmud is the major source text for all of Halakha. We 
will restrict our discussion to those Talmudic sources 
concerning abortion which have served as the basis for later 
codifiers, and whose meaning and significance is still actively 
discussed. 
A. The Mishna Concerning a Difficult Labor 
The most explicit Talmudic ruling on therapeutic abortion 
is the following: 
If a woman is having difficulty giving birth, one cuts 
up the fetus within her and takes it out limb by limb, 
because her life takes precedence over its life. Once 
its greater part has emerged you do not touch it 
because you may not set aside one life for another 
[Uholut 7:6] 
This Mishna has become the cornerstone of all later 
Halakhic discussion and disputation on abortion as we shall 
see. We must examine the above passage against the background 
of fundamental Halakhic principles of capital law. 
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First is the notion of "pekua nefesh" - danger to life. 
All religious law can and must be suspended in cases of danger 
to life. There are three exceptions/ murder, incest and 
idolatry for which one must martyr oneself rather than 
transgress. Yet, for any other law one must transgress it to 
preserve life. 
Second is a principle explicated by the Talmud in Sanhedrin 
54b that "one may not put one life over another for you do not 
know that one's blood is redder than his fellows." It is to 
this principle that the Mishna refers once the fetus has 
emerged. It then prohibits the taking of the newborn infant's 
life to save its mother. The general principle of not ordering 
one life as more important than another thus begins to apply to 
the infant at the moment of its birth and no sooner. 
Since the ruling in this case is that we do not allow 
infanticide, but do allow feticide to save the mother's life, 
this must imply a lesser status for the fetus. Such is the 
explanation of Rashi (a 12th century gloss on the Talmud). 
"For as long as it has not yet emerged into the world it is not 
a nefesh [living person] and one may kill it to save the 
mother." [Rashi on Sanhedrin 72b] Note again the use of the 
word "nefesh," implying that "breath" is required for full 
personhood. As we shall see later, the more lenient schools of 
thought have interpreted this text broadly as teaching that the 
fetus is not a "person" and thus that abortion while not 
encouraged, is permitted for a wide variety of reasons. 
The more stringent school emphasizes the life-endangering 
nature of this case and interprets it very narrowly to mean 
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that abortion is absolutely prohibited, but not at the capital 
status of murder. Even though it is absolutely prohibited, we 
allow it as we would allow suspension of other laws when life 
, , 10 is at stake. 
B. The Ruling of Maimonides - The Fetus as Aggressor 
The understanding of this Mishna is further complicated by 
the code of Maimonides, who states: 
This too is a command not to take pity on the life of 
an aggressor. Therefore the sages have ruled that 
when a woman has difficulty in giving birth one may 
cut up the child within her womb because he is like a 
pursuer seeking to kill her. Once his head has 
emerged he may not be touched for we do not set aside 
one life for another; this is the natural course of 
the world.11 
Maimonides seems to add the notion that we are allowed to 
kill the fetus because it has the status of an aggressor. The 
Halakha permits, in fact insists, that one must kill any 
aggressor who is pursuing another with the intent to kill. 
Many have drawn the implication that it is only when the fetus 
can be classified as an aggressor that we may kill it to save 
its mother. That is, if the fetus is not the direct cause of 
danger to the mother, then we cannot abort the fetus even if 
this results in both fetus and mother dying. Others have 
argued that in order to be considered an aggressor, the fetus 
must be recognized as a full person. As Feldman points 
out, this controversial codification of the law by Maimonides 
has led to literally dozens of different explanations. We 
shall return to this point. 
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C. The Condemned Woman 
The Talmud discusses the fetus and abortion in another 
situation: a pregnant woman who is sentenced to execution. 
This passage is rather dramatic, even bizarre, and must be 
understood as an analysis of the principles involved, rather 
than a reflection of practice. Capital punishment was rarely 
carried out in the Talmudic Period. The Passage is as follows: 
Mishnah: If a woman is about to be executed one does 
not wait for her until she gives birth; but if she has 
already sat on the birth stool one waits for her until 
she gives birth . . . 
Gemara: But that is self evident for it is her body! 
It is necessary to teach it for one might have assumed 
since Scripture says "according as the woman's husband 
shall lay upon him" that it [the woman's child] is the 
husband's property, of which he should not be 
deprived. Therefore we are informed [that it is not 
so] . . . 
"But if she had already sat on the birthstool": 
what is the reason? As soon as it moves from its 
place in the womb it is another body. Rav Juda said 
in the name of Samuel: If a woman is about to be 
executed one strikes her against her womb so that the 
child may die first to avoid her being disgraced. 
[Arakhin 7a-b] 
13 Rochel Biale points out that this text seems extremely 
cruel but actually involves a great deal of compassion toward 
women. To understand this, we will briefly explain the major 
points of this text. The rule underlying the Mishna is that 
one does not delay between sentencing and execution. It is 
considered a form of psychological torment for the accused to 
wait in fear for the execution of a sentence. Therefore, once 
sentence is passed, the court must execute within 24 hours. 
The Mishna here extends this general rule to apply to a 
pregnant woman and concludes that her pain, that is the anguish 
of living under the sentence of execution, outweighs any 
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consideration we have for the life of the fetus. Neither 
consideration for the fetus itself nor her husband's rights can 
force a woman to endure the anguish of sentence for the 
duration of her pregnancy. Seen as an analysis of principles, 
this ruling gives the mother's interests a clear priority over 
those of the fetus or her husband's interests. 
The Mishna then makes an exception once labor has begun 
because the fetus is then a "separate body" though not yet a 
full person. Thus, a distinction is made between the fetus 
prior to the onset of labor where it is considered part of its 
mother and subordinate to her interest, and after the onset of 
labor but before birth. During labor, the fetus is a separate 
entity whose independence we recognize but not yet on equal 
status with its mother. 
The Gemora then goes on to indicate that in fact we kill 
the fetus just prior to executing the mother to avoid 
disgrace. Rashi here explains that were the mother to miscarry 
prior to or during her execution, this would disgrace her. 
This rather gruesome detail needs also to be understood as 
discussion of theoretical legal principles. What is 
established is the rule that abortion is permitted to prevent 
the mother great distress even if it is not a life-saving 
circumstance. The fetus is sacrificed to prevent the mother's 
anguish or shame. 
A few Halakhists have followed up on the logic of this 
ruling. For them it has become the cornerstone of a more 
lenient position on abortion. Moreover, we can notice that 
this Mishnah establishes a three-way distinction: the fetus 
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before labor, during labor, and the infant after birth. A 
special status is accorded to the fetus during labor. Not yet 
full personhood but, as we have said, a sort of individuality. 
If we go back now to the ruling on the difficult labor, we note 
that abortion to save the mother's life is permitted even after 
onset of labor. Perhaps, the argument goes, before the onset 
of labor, before the fetus acquires a partial individuality, we 
would allow abortion for reasons less serious than an imperiled 
lif e. 
14 The more stringent school of thought has chosen not to 
draw these conclusions but rather to view the status of the 
fetus in the case of a condemned woman as a special and 
exceptional case. According to this view, the fetus is 
condemned with the guilty mother and thus, its life has been 
forfeited. We cannot establish a Talmudic view of the ordinary 
fetus from this situation. This interpretation, however, is 
self-defeating, for even by its own reasoning, the status of 
the mother completely dominates any duty we have independently 
toward the fetus. If her condemnation applies to the fetus, 
then certainly the fetus cannot be said to have any status or 
"right to life." It, therefore, does not seem that one can 
avoid the almost radical implications of this Mishna. 
There are other Talmudic references to the fetus and its 
legal status. However, since they do not deal directly with 
abortion they have had a different sort of impact on 
contemporary Halakhic discussion. We will return to these 
passages in a later chapter. 
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Section 4. The Later Authorities and the Responsa Literature 
The Biblical, Talmudic and Early Rabbinic literature forms 
the binding code of Halakha to which later authorities must 
adhere. As we have seen, this early literature makes 
surprisingly few references to abortion. Moreover, many of 
these references are ambiguous or may be interpreted to apply 
to special and odd circumstances. In contrast, the literature 
from later authorities and the Responsa literature are vast. 
Because of the paucity of early authoritative ruling and also 
because the circumstances under which abortion was considered 
changed, this later literature reflects a vast spectrum of 
opinion in its understanding of the status of the fetus and the 
conditions under which abortion is allowed. Each of these 
scholars have attempted to base his ruling on understanding of 
the earlier literature which they accepted as Halakhicly 
binding. 
A. The Two Branches 
15 Feldman has proposed some useful generalizations to 
help organize this vast array of differing opinion. First, all 
authorities are bound by the Mishna in Oholot (concerning a 
woman endangered during labor) to agree that: 1) the fetus is 
not a person of equal standing with its mother, 2) feticide is 
not murder in the usual sense and that one may perform an 
abortion if the fetus is the proximate cause of danger to the 
mother’s life. 
From these commonly-held views, Feldman sees a bifurcation 
into two branches in the Responsa literature. One branch 
interprets the Mishna in the narrowest sense and sees abortion 
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as "akin to murder." As Feldman says, "It then builds down 
from this strict position to embrace a broader interpretation 
of what constitutes life-saving situation."1^ The other 
branch "assumes no real prohibition against abortion . . . 
except perhaps during the most advanced stages of pregnancy and 
builds up from this position to safeguard against 
17 ... indiscriminate abortion." This branch views the Mishna in 
the broadest sense as telling us that even after labor has 
begun, the mother's best interest predominates. It is 
important to note that many of these later opinions, especially 
the Responsa literature, were written for actual case 
material. We shall cite a few examples from each of these. 
B. The Restrictive Approach 
This branch can be traced to Issac Lappronte (17th century) 
who ruled that abortion is permitted only when the mother's 
18 
actual life was directly threatened by the fetus. 
R. Grodzinski (19th century) extends this ruling in a case of a 
pregnant woman with a life-threatening heart condition. Here 
the ruling was that since the mother's life was endangered, 
abortion was permitted even though the fetus was not the 
. i g 
proximal cause of this danger. 
R. Grossnass (20th century) ruled against allowing an 
abortion in a severely retarded girl who had gotten pregnant, 
despite the danger that this pregnancy represented to the 
girl's well-being and ability to care for herself. Here again, 
the ruling turned on the fact that the girl's life was not 
endangered. He argued that the fetus is a potential life, only 
the actual life of the mother has greater value and only this 
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will justify an abortion. Lesser "values" like the mother's 
health or well-being do not suffice to override the value of a 
"potential life."2^ 
R. Hayyim Solovetchic (20th century) has ruled that the 
fetus must be an aggressor, i.e. the actual proximal cause of 
21 danger to maternal life in order to allow an abortion. 
R. Feinstein (20th century) has forbidden abortion for any 
fetal indications. He likens abortion to murder and thus 
cannot permit it even when the fetus is hopelessly deformed. 
Just as one may not take the life of an adult despite any 
22 . . handicap or poor chance for survival. Similarly, R. J. H. 
Zwieg has condemned abortion in the case of a thalidomide fetus 
23 
with documented deformity. One can readily understand the 
reasons of this strict branch in disallowing abortion for fetal 
indications. It is only when the value of the fetal potential 
is outweighed by another actual life that abortion is permitted 
according to this view. No such weighing of values is involved 
in cases of fetal abnormality. Even if the abnormality 
suffered by the fetus somehow lessened its value as potential 
life, which this view would not grant, there is nothing to 
outweigh this value except maternal distress, but then we are 
back to maternal indications for abortion and this branch 
recognizes only danger to health as sufficient reason to allow 
abortion. 
C. The Lenient Approach 
We turn now to the approach that assumes no real 
prohibition against abortion but may "build up" from this 
position. The earliest such authority is R. Trani (16th 
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century) who ruled that abortion was not homicide and was 
permitted for a mother’s health or her cure even if life itself 
were not endangered.24 R. Bachrach (17th century), in a case 
involving an adultress who wished to abort her illegitimate 
fetus, ruled that there is no prohibition against abortion of 
either a legitimate or illegitimate fetus. However, he states 
that we disallow abortions to discourage promiscuity. This 
25 position is very controversial, however. Another 17th 
century ruling by R. Mizrachi permitted an abortion in a case 
involving the fear that continued pregnancy would bring on an 
2 6 hysterical attack in the mother. This is an important 
precedent for introducing considerations of maternal 
psychological, as well as physical, health into the discussion. 
R. Emden (18th century) rejects the position of Bachrach 
and insists that an illegitimate fetus does have a lesser 
status, since, in theory, adultery is a capital offense. Even 
though we may not carry out this sentence, the illegitimate 
fetus has less claim to its potential life. More 
importantly, R. Emden ruled that even the legitimate fetus may 
be aborted to save the mother "great pain.” Orgadol (19th 
century) ruled, in the case of rape, that a woman need not 
"nurture seed implanted within her against her will."24 
Ben Zion Uziel (20th century) rules that abortion on demand 
is prohibited but that even a "slim” reason may suffice to make 
it allowable. He bases his ruling largely on the case of the 
3 0 
condemned woman which we have discussed. 
Moshe Zwieg (20th century) cites a law from Maimonides 
regarding a pregnant woman craving for food. Her husband may 
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not stop her from overeating or eating strange foods by arguing 
that this will cause a miscarriage. The rule given is that 
"her pain is to be considered first." R. Zwieg, noting that 
"her pain" takes precedence over the life of the fetus, finds 
that there may be sufficient reasons involving maternal 
31 
avoidance of pain that would justify abortion. 
This principle that one may permit an abortion to save the 
mother great pain is taken up by R. Weinberg (20th century) who 
rules in a case involving German measles that abortion is 
permitted because of the distress and pain that the mother 
32 
would suffer with a deformed child. Notice that here, as 
in the more restrictive approach, a fetal indication cannot 
justify abortion. However, if one views that fetal indication 
in terms of its affect on the mother then this branch of 
thought will permit an abortion to save the mother pain and 
anguish. The principle is preserved: there can be no "lesser" 
fetus because of a deformity. For both branches of thought, 
all fetuses are created with equal value. Some may cause 
distress by their deformity and this distress may outweigh its 
value. Similarly R. Waldenberg (20th century) has ruled that a 
Tay-Sachs child may be aborted to save pain and psychological 
suffering of its parents. We cannot abort the fetus with 
the argument that we are saving it pain, since this would be 
tantamount to euthanasia which is not permitted. It is 
important to stress that according to this view there are no 
possible fetal indications for abortion. Quality of the future 
child’s life is never a consideration when balanced against no 
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life. Only maternal indications, be they medical, 
psychological or others, can be balanced against the life of 
the fetus. 
Section 5. Conclusion 
In this part we have given a very brief overview of the 
classical Halakhic literature pertaining to abortion. We have 
seen that undisputably abortion is permitted, in fact required 
when the fetus is directly threatening the mother’s life. This 
much, at least, is unanimously accepted and even this much is 
in significant contrast with certain Catholic opinions. 
Beyond this narrow consensus there are disagreements in the 
classical literature as to the status of the fetus and as to 
what circumstances and needs outweigh that status and permit an 
abortion. We have tried to indicate that even within the 
traditional Halakhic literature a division of opinion has 
existed from the earliest of times. 
One of our original questions was: what is the Jewish view 
on abortion? Even restricting ourselves to traditional 
Halakhic sources we have no complete and definitive answer. 
The literature rather spans a broad spectrum of opinion, all of 
it claiming to be within the realm of Halakha. There are, in 
other words, varying precedents that one may draw upon in 
formulating an authentic Jewish view of abortion. 
In the next part, we will discuss the contemporary Jewish 
writing on abortion. As we shall see, the opinion becomes even 
more fragmented and polarized. For up to this point we have 
only been dealing with authors who consider Halakha as binding 
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divine law though they may disagree as to the nature and 
content of that law. In dealing with contemporary authors, we 
will continue to focus on those who view the Halakha as 
important but must also mention those for whom Halakha 
represents only a source of moral ideas and historical Jewish 
laws but who do not feel themselves bound by either the ethics 
or law of traditional Halakha. The contemporary reform 
movement in Judaism is one example of this view. The question 
must focus on how we interpret and apply the traditional 
literature. What method of hermeneutics or legal thinking, or 
textual criticism are used in approaching the traditional 
literature? Are there competing interpretations? Can any 
interpretative system claim to be "authentic"? In moving to 
the contemporary debate these are the questions we must keep in 
the back of our minds. 
We must abandon the question as to what is the Jewish view 
of abortion and ask: Given the rich and complex body of 
Halakhic thinking on abortion, how have Rabbinical authors used 
this tapestry, as it were, to help resolve or at least 
understand the ethical and religious issues involved in 
abortion? 

Chapter III 
Abortion and Contemporary Halakhic Exegesis 
Section 1. Overview of Contemporary Positions 
In considering the contemporary Jewish views on the 
abortion issue, we are mostly concerned with examining how 
Halakha is used in formulating those views. To this end we can 
consider two axis or polarities dividing the field into four 
quadrants. On one axis, we can consider an author's view of 
Halakha, its nature, evolution and the degree to which it is 
normative and binding on his ethical-moral beliefs and 
practice. Along this axis there is broad spectrum of opinion. 
On one end, we find an absolutist notion in which Halakha is 
divine, unchanging and absolutely binding in all its 
particulars. Towards the middle of this line, we find authors 
like Robert Gordis1 who view Halakha as a more fluid and 
dynamic body of law which can change with new ethical 
insights. On the far end, we find authors like Brickner or 
3 
Washofsky who look to Halakha as an historically interesting 
source of Jewish values but who do not consider it either 
divinely ordained or morally binding. 
On the other axis, we consider an author's view of 
abortion. At one end, we find authors who would only permit an 
abortion to save the mother's life. On the other end, we find 
authors who permit abortion for any reason whatever. 
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The important point for our discussion is that rather than 
running parallel and establishing a correlation, these axis are 
perpendicular, i.e. unrelated at an important level. Like any 
perpendicular axis, they divide the field into four quadrants. 
Indeed, we find opinions that fit each of these four 
quadrants. There is the stringent orthodox who are restrictive 
on abortion and strict on the authority of Halakha in their 
lives. But there are also authors who consider Halakha 
absolutely binding but are lenient on abortion because of their 
. . 4 belief that this is the correct Halakhic opinion. There are 
also authors for whom Halakha is not binding but who believe 
that the Halakha is in agreement with their own moral intuition 
in allowing abortion. Another group of authors who do not take 
Halakha to be binding also interpret this Halakha to be liberal 
on abortion and therefore reject the Halakhic opinion because 
5 their own ethical beliefs are strictly anti-abortion! 
We will examine these four quadrants in the following 
sections. 
Section 2. The Stringent Orthodox Position 
This is the position we have discussed in the 
Introduction. The view that it has articulated is that Jewish 
Halakha is anti-abortion except under the circumstance in which 
the mother's life is in serious danger. Thus, abortion for 
non-life-threatening reasons, such as psychological well-being, 
economic, social, and family planning is not permitted. 
This stringent camp, as we have said, has claimed a 
observer status for its position vis-a-vis the Halakha; 
specia 1 
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claiming that its views correlate with the strictness of its 
adherence to Halakha; and that a more lenient view of abortion 
correlates with a deviation or falling away from authentic 
Jewish tradition. These authors also claim that their own view 
is arrived at in a simple reportorial sense. That they are 
acting as neutral judges simply comparing Halakhic cases in a 
simple legalistic fashion. They deny introducing any 
philosphical or ethical bias into this process and accuse the 
more lenient camp of introducing such philosphical and ethical 
bias. This position, as Green states: 
has been forcefully articulated by some of the leading 
English language writers and commentators in Jewish 
Biomedical ethics [and is] . . . the position one is 
most likely to encounter in contemporary texts or 
articles dealing with questions of Jewish Bioethics.6 
The result is a body of writing . . . which represents 
only one side, one voice, in a complex tradition but 
which often presents itself as the normative Jewish 
view.^ 
8 9 We refer here to writers such as: Adler, Bleich, 
Cormi,'1'0 Halibord,Jakobovitz , Klein,'1"3 Rosner,^ 
Steinberg,15 Tendler,16 and Fiensten 17 
Section 3. The Lenient Halakhist 
The stringent orthodox position has been criticized by a 
growing number of commentators who are also working within the 
Halakhic framework. Thus, a more lenient camp is beginning to 
emerge and offer alternative views of the choices available 
within the Halakhic tradition. These authors point both to 
legal Halakhic precedent, which is plentiful as we have seen, 
and to broader philosphical theological aspects of Judaism in 
support of this position. 
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Ronald Green has argued that the stringent orthodox camp is 
"displaying a markedly conservative tendency that is out of 
keeping with much of the spirit of earlier traditions as well 
18 
as many of the explicit rulings of the tradition." Green 
goes on to argue that the stringent orthodox position has lost 
sight of the humanistic intentiona1ity of many of the 
19 fundamental teachings of Judaism. 
Similarly Blu Greenberg notes that 
There are no real precedents for what we now call 
abortion on demand. One obvious way to maintain some 
integrity within the Halakhic framework would be to 
broaden the interpretation of therapeutic abortion. 
To extend the principle of precedence of the mother's 
actual life and health to include serious regard for 
the quality of life as well. And there exists in 
Halakha some precious precedents where exactly that 
has been done.2® 
According to these authors and others similarly minded, "the 
21 Halakha must be maintained as the focus for discussion." 
Yet within that structure, one finds lenient attitudes towards 
elevating the needs of the mother or the couple so that these 
needs can outweigh the value of the fetus under certain 
circumstances. 
Another example is given by the chief of the religious 
court in Jerusalem who recently permitted the abortion of 
Tay-Sachs fetus because the mental and spiritual needs of the 
2 2 
mother justified an abortion. 
Section 4. The Non-Halakhic Permissive Position 
As we have stressed already, by non-Halakhist we do not 
mean positions that discard the Halakha but rather positions 
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that do not regard it as absolute binding normative law. 
Reform Judaism, for example, will not accept the authority of 
Halakha but will look to the Halakhic tradition as a source for 
classical Jewish ideas. Conservative Judaism takes an 
intermediate position regarding Halakha as an historical 
dynamic process that is divine in inspiration but evolves 
time and changes. We limit ourselves to a few examples, 
literature is itself vast. 
Balfour Brickner, a well-known Reform Rabbi and schol 
has stated that his position on abortion rests on both hi 
liberal progressive politics and his reading of Halakha: 
Jewish law does not consider a fetus a person. Jewis 
law agrees with the majority opinion of the Supreme 
Court . . . The unborn have never been recognized in 
the law as persons in the whole sense . . . 
Judaism permits abortion, let us state that 
clearly . . . .23 
For Brickner, the text of Rashi that a fetus is not a 
"nefesh" [person] is central. Therefore, one may conside 
variety of circumstances as legitimizing the need for abo 
and 
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Psychological needs of a woman as, for example, women 
with large families who simply cannot face another 
pregnancy . . . Abortion is a technique which should 
be freely available to women seeking physical and 
mental health . . . Judaism looks on abortion with 
distaste, but it clearly permits it and permission is 
what is at issue in the current debate raging in 
America.24 
Thus Brickner is not bound by the Halakhic law and within 
his theological scheme he could justify abortion despite the 
Halakha. Yet Brickner does not take such a stance because his 
own reading of the Halakhic sources is that of permissive 
Halakhic precedents. In fact, Brickner is critical of the 
stringent camp: 
4 
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Despite the plethora of evidence from Judaism 
recognizing the legality of abortion, [some] orthodox 
Jewish authorities have taken and continue to take a 
negative view toward abortion. The reasons [for the 
strict orthodox] prohibition on abortion despite the 
Rabbinic literature permitting abortion are complex 
and diverse ... It is precisely because of this 
unique regard for the sanctity of human life [in the 
Jewish tradition] that we see as most desirable the 
right of any couple to be free to produce only that 
number of children whom they could feed, clothe and 
educate properly; only that number to whom they could 
invest themselves as real parents as creative partners 
with God ... It is precisely this traditional 
respect for the sanctity of human life that prompts us 
to support legislation enabling women to be free from 
the whims of biological roulette. 
2 6 A similar view is expressed by Rabbi Mark Washofsky. 
These same authors do not hesitate to reject classic Halakhic 
views, for example on capital punishment, the strict observance 
of the Sabbath or questions of dietary proscription. Yet on 
the issue of abortion, it is because of Halakhic rulings rather 
than despite them that these authors have taken their 
positions. In our view, this throws serious doubt on the 
correlation claim. 
The next group of authors agree with Brickner and Washofsky 
that Halakha is permissive with regard to abortion. They also 
agree that Halakha is not binding. But taken together, they 
come up with the opposite conclusion: if abortion is not 
prohibited that is an Halakhic shortcoming. It should have 
been prohibited! 
Section_5_._The Non-Halakhic Anti-Abortion Position 
There are several authors who fall into this camp, their 
position is that abortion should be severely restricted despite 
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the permissiveness of the Halakha as they read and interpret 
it. Thus they find themselves anti-abortion, not because of 
Halakhic rule, but rather because they do not feel bound by a 
too lenient Halakhic stance on this issue. The mere existence 
of such a position should put to rest once and for all the 
correlation thesis. 
Thus Richard Block criticizes the Reform Movement's use of 
Talmudic texts to justify its claim "that the Talmud supports 
the holding the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade that an unborn 
child is not a person and therefore the pregnant woman’s right 
27 
to an abortion may not be unreasonably restricted." 
Block asks. 
Is it appropriate for Reform Jews who do not accept 
the legal authority of Halakha to utilize its 
precedents in advocating the right to abortion .... 
. . . we would be foolish to take guidance from 
Talmudic decisions and medieval commentators upon them 
when the authorities base their rulings on the state 
of science and medicine of the time. Thus in my view 
even if the Rabbis of the Talmudic period had in fact 
believed as Rashi asserts that a child is not a nefesh 
until it is born, we could hardly accept this 
reasoning uncritically today ... We need hardly 
defer to Talmudic rulings which may have been based on 
ignorance of things the Rabbis had no way of knowing 
in their own age, particularly when medical or 
scientific issues are involved.28 
In other words, Block feels that contemporary scientific 
evidence regarding the physiology of the fetus would argue for 
considering the fetus an "identifiable human-to-be already in 
the process of becoming." Therefore we must respect its 
individuality and cannot permit abortions except under the most 
dire emergencies. This position is in odd contradistinction to 
the stringent orthodox position which holds that all Talmudic 
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rulings are divinely inspired and no "new" scientific evidence 
is relevant. However, that stringent orthodox position 
believes its anti-abortion stance is derived from, not 
contrasted with, Talmudic opinion. 
After conceding that legal precedent in Halakha is 
permissive with regard to abortion. Block argues 
Rather than wend a tortuous way through the time and 
place bound specifics of various cases and rulings as 
if we were lawyers practicing law before a court whose 
jurisdiction we do not acknowledge, we ought to seek 
out the fundamental moral thrust of Jewish tradition 
and its enduring values . . . My guess is that the 
rabbis simply did not envision a Jewish woman wanting 
to abort an unborn child for any reason other than to 
save her own life. 
This appeal to Jewish 
also made by the more 
31 32 Greenberg, Green, 
opposite conclusion. 
values over and above Halakhic law is 
3 0 liberal Halakhists such as Biale, 
but with the intent of coming to the 
Feldman, at first part of this group. 
ends up agreeing with Block. 
After a soul-searching discussion, Feldman concludes 
So I have joined forces with those conservative voices 
in the community who disallow abortion except for the 
gravest reasons such as threat to life, though that's 
not what the more liberal Jewish legal tradition 
provides. It's important to remember how my stand 
developed. Our mothers and grandmothers who came to 
the rabbis and asked questions about abortion spoke 
from an entirely different mental set. They were 
women who, if they had three children, knew that the 
fourth child would go without shoes but it didn't 
matter, money was not a factor .... 
. . . The philosphic rather than the legal Jewish 
tradition must be brought to bear, stressing reverence 
for life and even potential life.33 
Like Block, Feldman rejects what he sees as a permissive Jewish 
Halakha by arguing that social-ethical conditions that 
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determined that law were different and no longer applicable. 
We find Feldman claiming that the thrust of extra-legal and 
personal view of Jewish life and ethics but not the Halakha 
leads him toward an anti-abortion position. 
David Novak also writes in opposition to abortion: 
This analysis is within the scope of modern Halakhic 
thinking which I would characterize as not only 
examining the various precedents within the Halakhic 
literature and also taking into consideration (1) 
philosophical and theological perspectives, (2) 
historical background .... 
In other words, general moral standards universally 
accepted take precedence over specific [Halakhic] 
technicalities .... 
In other words, law [Halakha] based on empirical 
evidence admits of modification when newer empirical 
evidence becomes available . . . Any inferences from 
rabbinic sources that belittle the status of the fetal 
life are highly suspect on the basis of the latest 
scientific evidence. This evidence assigns a much 
higher biological status to the life of unborn child 
than had heretofore been known.34 
These last 
non-Halakhists 
arguments are 
struggling to 
typical in the literature of 
remain attached to some core set 
of Jewish values but unable to agree with 
rulings. And these arguments tend to run 
particular 
as follows 
Halakhic 
The law 
must be seen in the context in which it was written, i.e. 
within a given social and ethical system which may no longer 
exist. Moreover, scientific advances, even ethical advances, 
should be taken into consideration if these newer insights were 
not available. We should not be blind to changes in either 
social, ethical or scientific thought. 
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What is new about these arguments is not their form but the 
fact that they view Halakha as too liberal on abortion. They 
call for an abandoning of this lenient Halakhic stand in favor 
of a stricter, more "scientific" view of abortion. 
The fact that reasonable scholars can plead in the name of 
scientific evidence and a general ethic for the abandonment of 
a too permissive Halakhic stand on abortion should put to rest 
the correlation claim once and for all. The fact that these 
authors are in complete agreement with the stringent position 
with regard to abortion but view the Halakhic literature in the 
complete opposite way establishes the multiplicity of meanings 
and possible interpretations of the Halakha on this issue. 
Section 6. Conclusion 
We have presented views from all four quadrants defined by 
the Halakhic authority polarity and the abortion polarities. 
We find reasonable scholars disagreeing about the morality of 
abortion, about the normative authority of Halakha and about 
just what the Halakha has to say in regard to abortion. But we 
do not find that these disagreements correlate in the way the 
stringent camp claims they should if an anti-abortion stand is 
derived simply from a strict adherence to Halakhic principles. 
Several issues that have been touched on will require 
greater discussion. What is the method of Halakhic exegesis or 
interpretation that the stringent camp is claiming as 
authentic? Are there alternate methods of approaching the 
Halakha in an "authentic" fashion? Given the diversity of 
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Halakhic precedents, how does the stringent camp arrive at its 
position? Is there an interpretive bias? What is its source? 
Related to these issues is the question of the "spirit" or 
"thrust" of Jewish thinking and ethics that is often referred 
to. Is it legitimate to introduce general theological and 
philosophical principles into a Halakhic discussion? Who 
determines just what authentic Jewish ethics or philosophy is? 
More precisely, is it actually possible to discuss Halakhic 
issues without willy-nilly introducing some interpretive 
philosophy or theology? 
We will look at these questions in subsequent chapters. To 
start with, we will look at how the stringent camp views its 
own method and ideas about Halakhic decisions in order to 
better understand how this camp's position comes about. 

Chapter IV 
The Stringent Halakhist and Legal Absolutism 
Section 1. Introduction 
In this chapter we will examine the stringent orthodox 
understanding of its own interpretive method. In a subsequent 
chapter, we will introduce a framework to critique this view. 
For now, however, it is important to understand the view this 
position takes on Halakha and on its own relation to that 
Halakha. This stringent orthodox position is perhaps the most 
difficult for contemporary readers to understand, both in terms 
of its method and in terms of its conclusions. By illuminating 
this position we can, therefore, clarify some basic and 
important distinctions in the approach to textual exegesis and 
interpretation. 
In reading the literature, one at first gets the impression 
that there is less of an ethical or moral discussion than proof 
text citation and reliance on authority pronouncement. In 
fact, it is part of the stringent orthodox claim that its 
approach to Halakha is legalistic and technical, not 
philosophic or moral. In a later section we will try to show 
that this is not, in fact, the case. However, we invite the 
reader to begin to think of the real issues that are the deep 
structure behind and motivate the seemingly superficial proof 
text arguments. 
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Section 2. Halakha as an Absolute 
The stringent orthodox camp is committed in the first place 
to both the absolute and unchanging nature of Halakha. There 
is a single, divinely revealed law that, among other things, 
defines the status of the fetus and the limited circumstances 
under which abortion is allowed. The ontological status of the 
fetus has been built in to the divine creation. We are left 
with the epistemological problem of discovering that status by 
correctly interpreting the body of revealed law. 
Thus Bleich states emphatically, "Jewish law does not 
change."1 Bleich goes on to explain his view that Halakha is 
a synthetic a priori. He quotes the Talmud and explains: 
Even that which a conscientious student will one day 
teach in the presence of his master was already 
revealed to Moses at Sinai. [Palestinian Talmud Peah 
2:4] All of Halakha is inherent in the original 
revelation at Mt. Sinai. Some positions of Halakha 
were fully formulated; others remain latent, awaiting 
investigation and analysis. Often it is the need of 
one hour, a specific query or problem which serves as 
the impetus to discover what has been inherent in the 
Halakha from the moment of its inception. The result 
is not a change or a new construct. It is a priori in 
the sense that it was always present in Torah, it is 
synthetic only in the sense that it requires a 
stimulus to prompt the investigation which serves to 
reveal that which had already been available.2 
Despite what is probably an incorrect use of the term 
"synthetic a priori" when referring to revealed truths, 
Bleich's intention is clear. He believes that the written 
code, the Bible, together with its complete exegesis, the oral 
law, was all divinely revealed at one historic period. Thus 
Halakha begins as a complete and perfect set of laws which is 
also completely known and understood by Biblical era priests. 
What follows is a sort of epistemological entropy. The written 
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law is preserved but the oral law is imperfectly passed down. 
Mistakes and then disagreements set in as more is forgotten and 
confused. Thus, by the time of the Talmudic redaction which is 
an attempt to preserve the heretofore oral law in writing, 
there are many disagreements and confusions. The Talmud, 
however, has rules for resolving many of these conflicts in 
favor of one party or the other. Thus the Halakhist's job is 
to rediscover the original, divinely intended law from the 
mixture of truth and "noise" that has come down to him as the 
classical Halakhic literature. Notice that the only sense in 
which the law might legitimately change is to be forgotten or 
misunderstood. Also notice the monolithic nature of Halakha. 
In this view there should ideally be no disagreements and all 
of Halakha is self-consistent and, in fact, complete. 
Section 3. Halakha as a Legalistic System 
Closely related to the previous point is the legalistic 
nature of Halakhic interpretation. This view maintains that 
the best way to preserve and maintain the original Halakha is 
to stick very close to precedent laws and rulings. The most 
important bricks in the structure, then, are clear case laws 
and codes. 
Philosophical and theological categories by their very 
abstraction can easily change and mislead. Thus the function 
of a Halakhist is to decide - to adjudicate - the correct 
religious law in particular cases. If he succeeds, the Halakha 
survives. God is in the Halakhic details. For this function 
it is best to use clear precedents and apply them as closely as 
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possible. According to this view, the Halakha is less 
interested in cosmic principles than it is with clear action 
guides and rules. As Rabbi Danzinger has put it, "Halakha is 
3 
not theology, it is Divine Anthropology." 
Thus Bleich writes: 
It should be clearly understood that the question of 
whether or not the fetus is a person or "full human 
being" is largely irrelevant in Halakhic context . . . 
It is the nature of the prohibition and the specific 
regulations which are significant. Not matters of 
nomenclature which are of no Halakhic significance.4 
Similarly Carmy states: 
For me, abortion on demand is prohibited because 
Halakha says so and that's that. Thus a philosophical 
argument on abortion is . . . without practical 
implication for our lives.^ 
Moreover it is not only philosophical abstractions or notions 
from external secular sources that cannot be used in this 
adjudication process as Bleich has said, 
one may present one's views and those of liberal 
Judaism as forcefully and eloquently as one is able. 
Conceivably one may even argue that they are in 
keeping if not with the letter of the law with the 
spirit of Judaic values. But surely one should be 
mindful not to misrepresent Talmudic law or impugn the 
position of Rabbinic Judaism.6 
Bleich argues here that even if "Jewish values" were 
consistent with a liberal view on abortion that that is not 
relevant. Only the law as adjudicated by legalistic "Rabbinic 
Judaism" can serve as valid action guide. Of course, as we 
shall see, Bleich ignores those Rabbinic decisions which are 
more lenient on abortion. 
The physician-scholar Mark Adler echoes a similar view: 
For the orthodox Jew, medical ethics are based on 
divine law rather than philosophy. These laws 
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therefore are not subject to the whims of society 
. . . By the religious anchoring of medical ethics one 
is assured of a standard to be followed in every 
generation in every social milieu. The advantage of 
anchoring medical ethics in an inviolate law rather 
than a personal ethic . . . was demonstrated in recent 
history [i.e. the Nazi period].7 
And finally R. Stienberg states: 
Regardless of the philosophical and moral arguments 
both pro and con . . . the only valid approach for a 
committed Jew is to seek the guidance of Halakha and 
follow the solution of Jewish law.8 
This avoidance of philosophy is perhaps best stated by 
Steinsatz in reference not to contemporary authors but to the 
authors of the Talmud: 
A basic factor in the attitude toward abstraction is a 
deliberate evasion of abstract thinking based on 
abstract concepts. Rather we employ models in place 
of abstract concepts. The model is utilized in 
accordance with a series of clearly defined steps 
approved by tradition . . . abstract concepts are 
replaced by many illustrative examples . . . The 
weakness of all abstract thought lies in the fact that 
it is constantly creating new terms and concepts . . . 
we can never know whether they constitute a departure 
from the subject or are still relevant.9 
The models referred to by Steinsatz are specific codes of 
law or case law. Steinsatz expresses the danger inherent in 
any abstraction; it easily moves away from the concrete 
source. A specific ruling in a religious case is concrete and 
unchanging and can thereby "preserve" the law. Philosophical 
considerations, on the other hand, are fluid and will only lead 
to a departure from the relevant case material. 
If Steinsatz were correct, we may understand why it has 
been so difficult to extract the intent of the text. For we 
cannot impose abstract categories (especially those that have 
arisen a millenium later) on the text. It may simply make no 
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sense to ask, for example, what is the talmudic stand on the 
ontological status of the fetus. This question doesn't fit 
since the talmudic view is inductive rather than deductive. 
There may simply not be any central "notion" about the fetus 
from which the other rules are derivable. Rather, the talmudic 
view of the fetus is simply the totality of its rulings and 
comments on the fetus. 
Although there is something strangely attractive about 
Steinsatz’s theory, we will ultimately have to reject it. We 
simply cannot accept a mode of interpretation that does not 
involve abstractions and generalizing principles, as we shall 
argue in the next chapter. 
The stringent orthodox position is not merely claiming that 
its method of interpretation is legalistic but also that its 
method puts it in continuity with the Halakha itself. Thus 
while claiming to be merely reporting what is inherent in the 
writings of previous authorities, they claim the "mantle" of 
these authorities for their decisions. 
Section 4. Summary 
We have shown that the stringent orthodox camp views 
Halakha as absolute, complete, consistent and unchanging. 
Philosophical and theological considerations, whether from 
Jewish or secular sources, are irrelevant in adjudicating a 
Halakhic ruling. Only a strict legalistic method of comparison 
with established Halakhic law and case material (from, e.g., 
the Responsa) is relevant. Ethical complexity is preserved not 
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in theological meditation but in concrete acts governed by a 
concrete law of cases. 
Yet there is no real clarification as to how, given a 
literature as complex as the Halakhic views of abortion, one 
actually goes about interpreting cases and applying 
conclusions. Rather a naive view is proposed that both 
empowers the Halakhist with the authority of his predecessors 
while simultaneously claiming no personal bias or legislating 
power is involved in the Halakhic decision-making. We turn now 
to a critique of this position. 

V Chapter 
The Nature of the Halakhic Process 
Section 1. Introduction 
1 2 3 4.5 Green, Lubarsky, Greenberg, Biale, Gordis 
and others have criticized the conservative and antimodern 
nature of the restrictive orthodox position on abortion. In 
this chapter and the next, we will present a new approach 
toward an understanding and critique of this position. This 
approach will supply a unified framework borrowed from the 
judicial theory of Benjamin Cordozo.^ It is based on a 
serious consideration of the stringent orthodox claim 
concerning the legalistic nature of Halakhic interpretation. 
To the best of our knowledge, this approach is original with 
this paper as other critics have approached the stringent 
orthodox view and method by applying religious rather than 
legal analysis. 
Cordozo’s thesis, as we shall see, is that there is no such 
thing as a purely legal method based solely on making 
comparative juxtapositions of precedent case material. Rather, 
there is a continuum of abstraction or generalization that must 
intervene. Moreover, at each step of the process choices must 
be made and these are more often than not the site for the 
introduction of personal bias and beliefs. Thus, according to 
Cordozo, every judge (read Halakhist) is a legislator. 

52 
Section 2. Cordozo *s Framework 
Since the stringent orthodox camp has insisted that its 
position can only be understood as a legalistic one, we will 
organize our critique as an analysis of methods of legal 
interpretation and adjudication. Benjamin Cordozo has 
formulated an elegant and forceful argument on the subject in 
his book. The Nature of the Judicial Process. Written about a 
very different legal system, nevertheless the structure of 
Cordozo's analysis is equally valid for religious law. We will 
find it constructive to borrow Cordozo's framework and 
categories . 
To begin, we recall a quote from R. Bleich and juxtapose it 
to one from Cordozo. The similarity speaks for itself: 
Bleich: 
Often it is the need of the hour a specific query or 
problem which serves as the impetus to discover what 
has been inherent in the Halakha from the moment of 
its inception . . . the investigation serves to reveal 
that which had already been available [in the 
Halakha].7 
Cordozo: 
The theory of older writers [on legal method] was that 
judges did not legislate at all. A preexisting rule 
was there embedded if concealed in the body of the 
customary law. All that the judges did was to throw 
off the wrappings and expose the statue to view.8 
It is this "naive" view of interpretation that Cordozo 
takes to task. Cordozo lays the foundation of his argument as 
follows: 
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what 
sources of information do I appeal for guidance? In 
what proportions do I permit them to contribute to the 
result? In what proportions ought they to 
contribute? If a precedent is applicable, when do I 
refuse to follow it? If no precedent is applicable. 
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how do I reach the rule that will make a precedent for 
the future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the 
symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek 
it? At what point shall the quest be halted by some 
discrepant custom, by some consideration of the social 
welfare by my own or the common standards of justice 
and morals? . . . Some principle however unavowed and 
inarticulate and subconscious has regulated the 
[decision] ... In such attempt at analyses as I 
shall make there will be need to distinguish between 
the conscious and the subconscious. I do not mean 
that even those considerations and motives which I 
shall class under the first head are always in 
consciousness distinctly so that they will be 
recognized and named at sight. Not infrequently they 
hover near the surface. They may, however, with 
comparative readiness be isolated and tagged and when 
thus labeled are quickly acknowledged as guiding 
principles of conduct. More subtle are the forces so 
far beneath the surface that they cannot reasonably be 
classified as other than subconscious. It is often 
through these subconscious forces that judges are kept 
consistent with themselves and inconsistent with one 
another. We are reminded by William James in a 
telling page of his lectures on Pragmatism that every 
one of us has in truth an underlying philosophy of 
life, even those of us to whom the names and notions 
of philosophy are unknown or anethema . . . All their 
lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot 
name have been tugging at them - inherited instincts, 
traditional beliefs, acquired convictions, and the 
result is an outlook on life, a conception of social 
needs, a sense, in James’ phrase, of "the total push 
and pressure of the cosmos" which, when reasons are 
nicely balanced must determine where choice shall 
fall. 9 
It is certainly a testament to Cordozo's insight that the 
above passage fits our discussion so well. Cordozo begins his 
formulation by separating out two related aspects of the 
judicial process. First is the question of the legal 
methodology and 
a small part of 
of precedent is 
here Cordozo 
the judicial 
more complex 
recognizes that precedent is only 
armamentarium. Moreover, the use 
than would at first appear. 
Second is the question of the extra-legal attitudes and beliefs 
that a justice brings to the complex legal method. Cordozo 
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stresses the individual predilections here. However, for our 
purposes we might recognize as well institutional and 
historical biases that might affect an entire class or group of 
scholars working from a similar socio-ethica1 background. Thus 
a source for systematic bias is introduced. 
Cordozo goes on to discuss the question of legal 
methodology, 
The first thing he [a justice] does is to compare the 
case before him with the precedents, whether stored in 
his mind or hidden in the books. I do not mean that 
precedents are ultimate sources of the law supplying 
the sole equipment that is needed for the legal 
armory, the sole tools. . . . Back of precedents are 
the basic judicial conceptions which are the 
postulates of judicial reasoning and farther back are 
the habits of life, the institutions of society in 
which those conceptions had their origin and which, by 
a process of interaction, they have modified in 
turn. 
In examining precedents, one must be aware of the "habits 
of life" and "institutions" within which these precedents came 
to be established. As Cordozo points out, often the law and 
its contextual society are mutually reinforcing a sort of 
institutional symbiosis. Yet we must ask when quoting a 
precedent, Has the context now changed? Are we still living 
with the same habits that gave it value and meaning? 
Finding the correct precedents, as difficult as this might 
be, is only the beginning: 
. . . The problem which confronts the judge is in 
reality a twofold one: he must first extract from the 
precedent the underlying principle, the ratio 
decidendi; he must then determine the path or 
direction along which the principle is to move and 
develop. . . . The first branch of the problem is the 
one to which we are accustomed to address ourselves 
more consciously than to the other. Cases do not 
unfold their principles for the asking. They yield up 
their kernel slowly and painfully . . . 
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There is a constant need, as every law student 
knows, to separate the accidental and the nonessential 
from the essential and the inherent.H 
In attempting to apply a precedent, then, one is faced with 
three related tasks, each of which is again a possible source 
of systematic bias. First, one must separate the essential 
from the accidental. We will see in the following chapter that 
a considerable portion of the disagreement concerning the 
interpretation of classic Halakha on abortion revolves 
precisely on the point of what in a given precedent is 
essential and what is merely accidental. It becomes especially 
important for our discussion as the precedent cases are very 
specific and tend to contain particular circumstances as we 
have seen. For example, many lenient rulings are dismissed as 
turning on a particular unusual situation and therefore not 
applicable to general circumstances. 
A second task is the extraction of principle from the 
precedent case. This is related to the notion of 
generalization but is broader. Much like the previous task, 
this is open to considerable bias. It is also related to the 
question of how narrowly or broadly to interpret a precedent. 
How much information does it contain? How much can we derive 
from it? Notice, however, that we must abstract some principle 
from a case in order to apply it, according to Cordozo. 
Cordozo will argue that this abstraction is where any justice 
willy-nilly introduces his own "philosophy." The remarks 
quoted in the previous chapter by Bleich, Cormy, Adler and 
Steinberg eschewing the use of philosophy or general ethics are 
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simply untenable. To read a precedent case law and to then 
apply it requires generalizing, extracting principles, it 
requires abstract legal and moral categories. Moreover, it 
should be clear that the degree of generalization will depend 
to a great extent on how "close" to our current question the 
precedent case law is. The "closer" it is the less abstraction 
we need in order to make the comparison. On the other hand, if 
we wish to derive principle from "distant" precedent, e.g. from 
a different branch of law, we need a much greater 
generalization, a grander abstraction. We will come back to 
this point in the next chapter where we discuss the ways that 
other areas of Halakha have been applied to the abortion 
issue. For example, the Halakha concerning the Sabbath or the 
Halakha concerning treatment of terminally ill. When these 
precedents are used to argue for a particular position in the 
abortion discussion, the arguments necessarily involve 
extraction of broader principles and abstractions allowing more 
room for systematic bias, as we shall demonstrate. Thus a sort 
of inverse proportionality exists between the "closeness" of a 
precedent to its application and the degree to which 
abstraction and bias enter into the judicial or Halakhic 
process. 
Cordozo's analysis continues: 
Let us assume, however, that this task has been 
achieved and that the precedent is known as it really 
is. Let us assume too that the principle, latent 
within it, has been skillfully extracted and 
accurately stated. Only half or less than half of the 
work has yet been done. The problem remains to fix 
the bounds and tendencies of development and growth to 
act as the directive force in motion along the right 
path at the parting of the ways. 
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The directive force of a principle may be exerted 
along the line of logical progression, this I will 
call the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy, 
along the line of historical development this I will 
call the method of evolution, along the lines of 
customs of the community this I will call method of 
tradition, along the lines of morals and social 
welfare, the mores of the day and this I will call the 
method of sociology.12 
This dense paragraph contains the core of Cordozo’s thesis 
which we will attempt to summarize. Again, the focus is on how 
we interpret a precedent and then attempt to apply that 
interpretation in the judicial situation. Once we have 
extracted a principle from the case, Cordozo claims there are 
various factors that influence the way this principle is used 
or applied. First is the method of analogy or philosophy. We 
have already discussed this to some extent. This involves the 
question of how broadly a principle can be extracted. What 
cases are sufficiently analogous to be influenced by the 
principle? How far will we abstract the principle? How do our 
underlying beliefs effect these decisions? 
Second is the method of history or evolution. Cordozo is 
here referring to the concept that any precedent and its 
extracted principle exist within an historical context and may 
have to evolve with the changing historical context. As 
Cordozo quotes Holmes, "a page of history is worth a volume of 
13 logic.” Or more clearly: 
The point is rather that the conceptions [of law] 
themselves have come to us from without, not from 
within. That they embody the thought not so much of 
the present as of the past that separated from the 
past their form and meaning are unintelligible and 
arbitrary and hence that their development in order to 
be truly logical must be mindful of their origins.14 
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Both Green^ and Gordis^6 make similar arguments concerning 
the proper understanding and use of Halakha from its historical 
context. 
Third is the role that customs and tradition, even when 
these are not legally binding, play on the understanding of 
principles and their application. As Cordozo says: 
We look to custom not so much for the creation of new 
rules but for the tests and standards that are to 
determine how established rules shall be applied.17 
This is especially significant within an orthodox religious 
community in which tradition and preservation of customs is so 
important for maintaining a sense of identity and a group 
boundary. 
It is easy to see how customs which are not Halakhic can 
take on an almost moral force and be confused with truly 
binding religious law. This is another source of systematic 
bias that orthodox scholars are especially vulnerable to. As 
any complex religion has a literature, a law and a practice, it 
becomes difficult at times to separate the incidental customary 
practice from the law. 
Fourth is the consideration of social welfare or the method 
of sociology. 
. . . There are times when we must bend symmetry, 
ignore history and sacrifice custom in pursuit of 
other and larger ends . . . The final cause of law is 
the welfare of society.1® 
However, Cordozo cautions that often it is a particular 
justice’s view of the welfare of society, or a particular view 
of social morality or one set of imposed ideas of the "ideal" 
society that influences the way a justice [or Halakhist] will 
interpret and apply principles. 
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We must ask, are certain opinions on Halakha and abortion 
influenced by a scholar’s view of the role of women or the 
ideal of Mfamily?" More concretely, many Halakhic authors in 
discussing abortion speak of the need to "repopulate” the 
Jewish community in the wake of the holocaust. To what extent 
have these notions of "social welfare" influenced the process 
of Halakhic interpretation? 
Cordozo summarizes the complexity of the judicial process 
thus : 
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this 
and little more: logic and history and custom and 
utility and the accepted standards of the right 
conduct are the forces which singly or in combination 
shape the progress of the law. Which of these forces 
shall dominate in any case must depend largely upon 
the comparative importance or value of the social 
interests that will thereby be promoted or 
impaired.19 
It should be clear that this describes anyone who would attempt 
to interpret the classical Halakha. It is not enough to claim 
that the Halakha rules a certain way. One must consider the 
input that each of Cordozo's "categories of influence" has on 
any Halakhic scholar. 
Section 3. Summary 
We recapitulate the points most important for our 
discussion: the nature of interpreting and applying any legal 
literature based on case law involves a complex interaction of 
many factors. Each justice or Halakhist brings to the task a 
system of conscious and also subconscious beliefs. These 
beliefs may be personal or a shared system of assumptions 
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derived from the “push and pull" of a particular social ethical 
milieu. When searching for legal precedents, a justice or 
Halakhist may be biased in his choices and his opinion of which 
precedents are truly relevant. In examining a precedent, the 
essential must be distinguished from the accidental and here 
too the scholar may be influenced by a particular belief. 
Once the precedent has been chosen and its essential nature 
discerned, it cannot simply be compared to the situation or 
case under consideration. Cordozo insists that we extract a 
principle, some kind of generalizing or abstraction step must 
intervene between precedent and its application. Here again 
different scholars will often see different principles in the 
same precedent. Moreover, the level of abstraction will depend 
on how closely related the precedent is to the case under 
consideration. If it is from a different branch of law, for 
example, the principle extracted will tend to be very broad and 
abstract, to cover legal issues spanning many areas. Thus 
principles derived from precedent and more general ethical or 
philosophical principles are not distinct but according to 
Cordozo form a continuum. On one end, we interpret a precedent 
very narrowly, deriving a very circumscribed principle. On the 
other end, we hold certain broad and general moral principles, 
almost unconsciously, and may just "hang" them on to particular 
precedents. This is what Sandra Lubarsky calls, for example, 
"extra legal elements." There is no way to separate philosophy 
from adjudication. 
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Cordozo also discusses the application and development of 
the legal principles once they have been extracted. Here we 
must be careful to distinguish their source from their intended 
application. We must be aware of the historical context of 
principle and also how that context has changed so that a 
principle which has a certain meaning and function in its 
original context may be distorted by application to changed 
historical context. Similarly, we must consider the customs, 
traditions and mores that gave birth to a particular principle 
and not attempt to force its application onto a changed set of 
customs and mores. Finally the interpreter is aware of the 
social consequences that the principle may have had in its 
original context as well as being aware of his own beliefs and 
aspirations for society which may effect the understanding and 
application of legal principle. In other words, we must be 
aware of the teleological cause of our Halakhic decisions. 
In the next chapter, we will apply Cordozo's framework to 
the analysis of stringent orthodox position. We will discover 
the methodological sources of bias in selection of precedents, 
extraction of principles, and application of these generalized 
principles. We will also attempt to unearth the underlying 
philosophical theological assumptions as well as the 
teleological causes that underlie the stringent position. 

Chapter VI 
Critique of the Stringent Position 
Section 1. Introduction 
In this chapter we apply the framework based on Cordozo’s 
work to an understanding and critique of the stringent orthodox 
position. In Section 2, which we can consider the "evidence" 
portion of our argument, we will demonstrate a systematic bias 
in the stringent position's interpretation of the classical 
Halakhic precedents. We will review several of the important 
texts already mentioned in chapter 2 and introduce other 
Halakhic material that has been used as precedent in the 
Halakhic discussion of abortion. 
We hope to show that the bias is introduced at several of 
the methodologic levels introduced by Cordozo: selection of 
precedents, separation of essential from accidental factors, 
extrication of principles and application of principles. 
Moreover, as we search for legal precedents applicable to 
abortion in other areas of Jewish law we will find that broader 
generalization and hence greater danger for bias is 
introduced. This will be the topic of Section 3. 
In Section 4 we will and attempt to excavate the underlying 
philosophical and theological presuppositions of the stringent 
camp. These are the often unacknowledged assumptions that 
determine the consistency and systematic nature of the bias 
which enters into Halakhic adjudication at the task points 
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mentioned above. This section is somewhat risky, as we can 
only make a good guess as to what the underlying belief 
structure of a group might be. Nevertheless, we feel our 
suggestions capture the essence of these underlying 
structures. Moreover, we find confirmation for these belief 
structures from the fact that the critiques of Lubarsky'*' and 
2 Green described in chapter 4 can easily be derived from 
these assumptions. 
In Section 5 we consider what we have called the 
teleological causes of bias or what Cordozo calls the method of 
sociology. This involves the notion that a Halakhist, like a 
jurist, often decides on the basis of his aspirations for the 
consequences of laws. Thus a Halakhic decision may involve 
"legislation" for the social welfare. 
Section 2; Precedent and Principle. The Method of Analogy 
A. When Men Fight 
We have already mentioned the Biblical passage: 
When men fight and one of them pushes a pregnant woman 
and a miscarriage results, but no other misfortune 
ensues, the one responsible shall be fined according 
as the woman's husband may exact from him. But if 
other misfortune ensues the penalty shall be life for 
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. [Exodus 21:22] 
As we have seen in chapter 2, most scholars who are lenient 
on abortion take this passage as a precedent. They note the 
distinction drawn between the loss of the fetus and the loss of 
an adult life. The principle extracted is that feticide is not 
murder. Others would choose to draw even broader principles. 
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e.g. that the fetus has no status as a person. Yet even the 
narrowest interpretation would not support a strict prohibition 
on abortion. The only way out of this conclusion is not to 
accept this passage as a precedent at all. This is precisely 
the position Steinberg has taken. Noting the accidental nature 
of the abortion he finds that 
The Bible herein is not referring at all to induced 
abortion in the usual sense which is when the mother 
needs or request an abortion for any reason.3 
Here we have an example of systematic bias working at 
Cordozo’s very first task, that of determining the relevant 
precedent case material. Steinberg, focusing on the lack of 
intent, concludes that we can derive no principle from this 
passage concerning intentional abortion. To us this does not 
seem to be a close adherence to the traditional literature but 
rather a biased and selective approach, a predetermined 
conclusion about abortion that will force the text to comply. 
B. The Difficult Labor 
We have already mentioned the Mishna in oholot which 
commands fetal dismemberment during a difficult labor. The 
fetus is contrasted with the baby once it has emerged, when its 
status is equal to the mother’s. Here we find the two camps 
dividing along Cordozo's second task, determining what is 
essential. The permissive camp focuses on the status of the 
unborn fetus as the essential governing fact in the case. The 
principle extracted is, therefore, that the fetus is not a 
person and therefore it does not enjoy the same protection a 
person can claim. There may be a variety of circumstances 
under which we may permit its abortion. 
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The stringent orthodox position focuses on the danger to 
the mother's life as the essential part of the case and draws 
the very opposite principle. 
It is evident from the Mishna that were the fetus not 
endangering the mother's life prior to its birth, it 
would certainly be forbidden to destroy it.4 
Given the paucity of Talmudic material on abortion one may 
wonder why the exceptional case allowing abortion is recorded 
rather than the rule that states "it is certainly forbidden." 
Yet, this is the perfect example of Cordozo's point that 
underlying belief completely determines one's interpretation of 
a Halakhic ruling. For the stringent scholars, it is 
self-evident that abortion is forbidden. When the Mishna cites 
a precedent in which it is permitted, this case is understood 
as the rare exception proving the rule. 
To the more permissive camp, on the other hand, the case 
establishes the principle that maternal well being determines 
when abortion is permitted, which seems closer to the 
straightforward interpretation of the text. Note that we are 
not arguing now for the latter position, only pointing out that 
there is a choice of interpretations and a bias that determines 
how one chooses. 
C. Maimonides and the Concent of Aggressor 
Maimonides codifies the above ruling and then adds that the 
fetus is there likened to a pursuer [aggressor] whom it is 
permitted to kill. Feldman has shown that there are 
literally dozens of interpretations and explanations for 
Maimonides’ additional comment.^ The stringent camp 
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understands his ruling with the narrowest interpretation. Thus 
R. Soloveitchik has written: 
A fetus too is considered a person. It is only because 
of the law of saving one who is pursued that there is 
the ruling that the fetus is a person is put aside.7 
David Bleich has followed this logic even further, claiming 
that only when the fetus is the "proximate cause of the threat 
g 
to the mother" can we consider abortion. Moreover, he 
states "Maimonides' comment serves to establish that feticide 
. . 9 is a form of noncapital homicide." For it is homicide that 
is usually justified in the law by appeal to the aggressor 
concept. 
Once again, we find the stringent camp declaring that what 
is essential in the Maimonides ruling is the notion of the 
fetus as aggressor. That only because the fetus is an 
aggressor in this particular case may we abort. The principle 
extracted from Maimonides' ruling is that abortion is forbidden 
except under the unusual circumstance where the fetus is seen 
as aggressor on its mother's life. 
Notice that Maimonides' ruling is basically a permissive 
one. He states that we must kill the fetus to save the 
mother's life. Yet the stringent camp would draw a restrictive 
principle from his ruling. The whole notion of aggressor may 
simply be introduced as an explanation and is not the essence 
of the ruling. As Rachel Biale points out, many earlier 
authorities reject the notion that it is only because the fetus 
is an aggressor that we may destroy it. For if the aggressor 
concept is the essential point of the ruling, why is the infant 
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baby, once it has emerged, any less an aggressor? Why may we 
not destroy an infant on the same basis? 
Rather, it seems clear to more lenient scholars that what 
is essential in this case is the lesser status of the unborn 
fetus versus the status of the mother. 
D. The Condemned Mother and Her Fetus 
Recall the Mishna in Arakin 7a. This ruling states that we 
do not force the mother to wait and endure anguish in order 
that the fetus might be saved. Many authors have drawn a 
principle from this precedent that "great need" constitutes an 
allowable reason for abortion, even if that need is not 
medical. Biale quotes R. Emden (18th century) as basing his 
ruling on this source. "Clearly abortion is not forbidden when 
it is done because of great need."10 
The restrictive camp has chosen again to find the 
"essentials" of this precedent to be unique and unusual 
circumstances and therefore they simply do not use this as a 
precedent in considering abortion. The pattern is consistent 
with systematic bias. 
According to R. Feinstein, for example, we can draw no 
principle from this case because the fetus is condemned to 
death, together with its mother, at the moment of sentencing. 
Only this odd circumstance allows us to prioritize the mother's 
well being. Under other circumstances, Feinstein rules, that 
only an actual threat to mother's life would allow abortion.11 
The attempt to exclude this precedent from any useful 
interpretation or application forces some serious logical 
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difficulties. First, if the fetus can forfeit its life because 
of a crime (any capital crime) committed by its mother, 
certainly it must have far less status than a person. Recall 
that the Bible is very clear in regards to visiting the sin of 
the parent upon the child. To say the fetus is condemned with 
its mother is to say the fetus is "part" of its mother without 
individuality and we have no duties to preserve it. Second, 
even if it is true that the fetus is condemned with its mother, 
why does the mother’s interest predominate? At this point she 
too is condemned. We have two condemned beings and the Talmud 
is clear whose interest predominates. 
Regarding this Mishna and the previously mentioned Mishna, 
Steinberg has written ’’the common denominator in the cases 
mentioned in the Talmud is the existence of specific infrequent 
. . 12 
and exceptional conditions” and only because of these 
circumstances is abortion allowed. It seems equally likely that 
the common denominator is that both rulings establish a lenient 
precedent. 
E. Uber Yerek Immo - Pars Viscerum Matris 
Although the cases we have cited so far are the only 
Talmudic references to abortion, the Talmud does discuss the 
legal status of the fetus in Gitten 23b and Hulin 58a. One 
phrase used in these contexts is "uber yerek immo," the 
equivalent of the Latin phrase pars viscerum matris - the fetus 
is as a limb of its mother. This designation refers to ques¬ 
tions of ownership, conversion, levitical purity and the fetus’ 
capacity to own property. For example, with few exceptions, any 
13 
transactions made on behalf of a fetus are not binding. 
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Taken together, these references are usually understood to 
mean that the fetus has no "juridicial" personality. Although 
this has no direct bearing on the question of abortion, these 
precedents and rulings do differentiate the fetus and should be 
considered seriously. Instead, we find a total rejection of 
these notions by writers who claim to adhere strictly to every 
word of the Talmud. Thus Rosner: 
The Talmud compares the unborn fetus to an extra 
appendage of the mother . . . However, how can one 
compare the unborn fetus to a finger of the mother 
. . . the unborn fetus, if left alone, would develop 
into a full and complete human being.-1-4 
Similarly, Bleich states, "The fetus is not an appendage to 
15 
the mother but a being in its own right." Clearly these 
authors do not intend to argue with the plain meaning of the 
text. Rather, they are excluding these rulings from 
consideration as precedents relevant to abortion. Aptowitzer, 
on the other hand, takes this material more seriously and sees 
in it evidence of a division of opinion in the Talmud on the 
fundamental status of the fetus. ^ 
F. Maya Balma - It is Mere Fluid 
In the sources quoted so far, it would seem that the Talmud 
does not distinguish between different stages of a pregnancy. 
However, the Talmud does, in one instance, distinguish the 
first forty days of pregnancy from the rest. 
The ruling involves the law of priestly tithes. A priest's 
daughter may benefit from the tithe donations as long as she is 
part of her father's household. If she is married or a mother, 
she no longer counts as part of her father's household. The 
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Talmud in Yevomoth 69b then discusses what the rule is for a 
childless recent widow. The ruling is that she belongs to her 
father's household immediately upon being widowed. For even if 
she were to be unknowingly pregnant, for the first forty days, 
the fetus is mava balma - merely fluid. Thus, a woman is not 
considered pregnant for the first forty days. 
Clearly the Talmud recognized a distinction between the 
very early part of gestation and later pregnancy. This case 
presents a difficult challenge to anyone attempting Cordozo's 
set of tasks for interpretation. What is the essential aspect 
of this ruling? One could choose to read this case very 
narrowly as referring only to the legal recognition of the 
pregnant state for the mother. One might even argue that the 
Talmud is merely recognizing the difficulty of establishing 
pregnancy for the first forty days. On the other hand, one 
might choose to draw broader conclusions about the status of 
the early fetus concluding that abortion at this stage is 
completely permitted. 
Interestingly, rather than draw even the most narrow 
permissive principle from this rule, Carmy has focused on the 
ruling as a proof text for the status of the fetus after forty 
days of gestation. He recognizes three categories as a result 
of this ruling. 1) Before forty days, the fetus is not a human 
being but is a potential human being and abortion is prohibited 
because one may not destroy even potential life. 2) After 
forty days, the fetus is human but not fully fledged human 
being; during this period abortion is prohibited because it is 
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similar to murder. 3) At birth the infant becomes fully equal 
17 
to other human beings. Here again we find a stringent 
principle extracted from what seems to be a more lenient ruling. 
In contrast, R. Weinberg has used this precedent to 
establish the principle that prior to forty days abortion is 
permitted for any reason and the difficult questions only arise 
18 
after the fortieth gestational day. 
G. Post Natal Viability 
Another area of the law is related to the above discussion 
because it too can be seen as recognizing an evolving process 
in human development rather than a single fixed status. 
The Mishna in Sanhedrin 79a states that if one kills a 
prematurely born infant, one is not liable for capital 
punishment. A premature born infant is not considered viable 
until it has survived for thirty days. Moreover, since we can 
never know if an infant is full term or premature, the Talmud 
rules if one kills any infant before thirty days, he cannot be 
held liable for capital punishment. This certainly does not in 
anyone's mind make infanticide permissible. As we have seen, 
once the infant is born we must even let its mother die rather 
than touch it. The question only arises after the fact. If 
one commits infanticide, can we execute him? The answer is no, 
because he may have destroyed a nonviable life for which 
capital punishment cannot be extracted. 
The Mishna in Moed Katan 22a reinforces this notion of a 
distinction in status between an infant less than thirty days 
and one greater than thirty days. The ruling is that one does 
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not recite Kaddish [mourner’s benediction] nor does one offer 
the usual prescribed condolences for an infant of less than 
thirty days. 
19 
Green has suggested that these rulings represent a 
recognition of a process of development and maturation and 
social incorporation. All of which are stages that a 
fertilized ovum must pass through before we recognize it as a 
full-fledged member of the community of persons. 
In commenting on the same material, Bleich has concluded 
that ’’Willful destruction of the fetus [at any stage] is a 
capital crime except Halakha recognizes degrees of 
20 
viability.” [emphasis added] Bleich thus interprets this 
material in the narrowest fashion. He argues, in other words, 
that the fetus has an equal ontological status with other 
persons, as does the infant and the premature infant. It is 
only that we need to prove "viability" in order to punish the 
capital crime. 
H. Violating the Sabbath and the Dav of Atonement 
There is a well-established rule in Jewish law that peril 
to life suspends all religious duties and prohibitions with 
three exceptions. [The exceptions are idolatry, murder and 
incest. One must suffer death rather than violate these.] In 
particular, the laws of Sabbath or the Day of Atonement may be 
21 
suspended in cases of mortal danger. 
There are two relevant Talmudic rulings. In Arakin 7b the 
Talmud states that if a woman dies in childbirth, one brings 
the surgical knife even on Sabbath to extract and save the 
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fetus. The second case involves a pregnant woman who 
experiences overpowering hunger pains during the Day of 
Atonement [which is a fast]. The Talmud in Yoma 82a stipulates 
that she may partake of the food she craves lest she suffer 
miscarriage and the fetus die. 
The stringent camp has drawn broad principles from these 
rulings concerning the status of the fetus. Recall that many 
of these authors refused to interpret far more direct texts as 
relevant to the status of the fetus. In particular, Bleich has 
written "suspension of such significant religious observance 
[Sabbath or the Day of Atonement] is incompatible with an 
indiscriminate license to destroy [the] life [of a 
2 2 fetus]." The argument is that since the Talmud allows this 
desecration for the fetus, it must be a "person." 
23 This broad construction is rather forced, as Feldman 
points out. Notice that in regard to these precedents, it is 
the lenient camp which is forced into a narrow interpretation. 
The dilemma here is analogous to the one faced by contemporary 
physicians in treating fetal disease. If we treat fetal 
disease or violate the Sabbath to protect the fetus, we are 
implicitly recognizing the fetus as a valued individual. 
Certainly most of us would not want to withhold such aid. Yet 
once granted, can we then justify abortion on the basis of 
diametric opposed argument? We will leave this open. 
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I. The Argument from Silence 
We have discussed how one can draw biased sets of 
principles out of a given system of precedents. Can we draw a 
principle from the absence of precedent? Steinberg apparently 
does. Noting that there is no discussion in the Halakha of 
what we call today ‘abortion on demand,’ Steinberg argues from 
this silence: 
Apparently murder of fetuses has never existed in 
Jewish society during any period and thus there was no 
need for a specific discussion of this problem.24 
The more lenient camp sees a different principle operating 
• • • 25 in this silence. Biale has argued that women who wanted an 
abortion have simply not asked their Rabbis' opinion. Blu 
Greenberg draws precisely the opposite conclusion that 
Steinberg does, namely that the silence affords us an 
opportunity for leniency. There may be no responsa giving 
permission for abortion on demand, but then there are none that 
prohibit it by the same argument. More eloquently: 
Since there is no precedent for what we call abortion 
on demand, one obvious way to maintain some integrity 
within the Halakhic framework would be to broaden the 
interpretation of therapeutic abortion to extend the 
principle of precedence of the mother's actual life 
and health to include serious regard for the quality 
of life as well. And there exists in the Halakha 
literature . . . respected Halakhists [who] moved from 
purely physical to mental and emotional considerations 
of the mother which is what the current abortion issue 
is all about.26 
F. The Nature of the Prohibition 
Interestingly, the actual source and nature of the 
prohibition against abortion is disputed even within the 
stringent orthodox camp. A. Steinberg writes: 
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All agree that some prohibition against inducing 
abortion does exist. However, we find differences of 
opinion as to the nature, severity and grounds for 
this prohibition according to strict Halakhic ruling 
and criteria . . . All agree it is not actually 
murder.27 
2 8 Bleich agrees with Steinberg and points out that it is 
not even certain if the prohibition is actually Biblical or 
only a later Rabbinical edict. Yet despite not being able to 
ground these prohibitions in a substantial way, their camp 
insists that it is strictly prohibited. 
The approach taken to locating the category of offense 
involved in abortion has been to seek precedents and attempt to 
include abortion under their wing. Thus Steinberg: "we 
attempt to refer this prohibition to other existing and 
accepted prohibitions in the Bible [thus] making abortion an 
29 
offshoot of other forbidden acts." 
1. Abortion as Murder 
Despite Steinberg's claim above that all agree that 
abortion is not murder, some authors would categorize abortion 
as a type of murder. Bleich quotes R. Mizrahi as holding the 
opinion that abortion is actually in principle 
indistinguishable from murder. The difference in practice is 
that since we cannot be sure any fetus is viable, we cannot 
treat its destroyer as a murderer. However, the act remains 
30 
the act of murder. 
Given the contradictory Talmudic statements about the 
relation of abortion to murder, we find this position 
unsubstantiated and most authors would not agree with 
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R. Mizrahi. A similar position, however, has been taken by 
R. Feinstein in a telegram deploring the legalization of 
abortion in Israel. 
We are stirred to the depths of our souls [hearing] 
the report . . . that the Knesset accepted and 
affirmed the immoral law which legalized abortion even 
where in the opinion of expert physicians there is no 
danger to life ... We hereby state with absolute 
finality that a law which says you can abort a child 
prior to its birth is tantamount to murder ... It 
soils the good name ... of all who stood at Sinai 
heard and accepted the commandment "Thou shall not 
murder" . . . Israel must serve as a model to the 
world on how to conduct a sacred and pure family life 
and not, God forbid, the reverse.31 
It seems unusual to us that Feinstein would refer to the 
sanctity of family life in the context of discussing abortion 
unless the latter has influenced his judgment on the former. 
2. Abortion as Failure to Procreate 
A second approach views abortion as running counter to the 
Biblical summons "Be fruitful and multiply" and also includes 
abortion with the interdiction against onanism. Bleich points 
out that technically if this were the source for the 
prohibition, then the prohibition would be limited to the 
parents of the fetus, since one is only responsible for having 
32 
one's own children under this law. 
Moreover, Jochele has pointed out that the Biblical phrase 
"'Be fruitful and multiply’ is not ... a binding religious 
33 
commandment but was explicitly meant as a blessing." 
This sort of consideration would obliterate the distinction 
between abortion before or after forty days of gestation. More 
importantly, it would blur the distinction between an abstract 
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increasing of life and an actual individual fetus. We shall 
return to this issue later in the chapter. 
3. Abortion as Illegal Wounding 
A third approach has been to see abortion as a form of 
34 
"wounding.” It is a well established Jewish law that one 
may not unnecessarily wound oneself or others. This law has 
even been used by some to prohibit purely cosmetic surgery. 
Paradoxically, the source of wounding prohibition is the text: 
And it shall be if the wicked man shall be worthy to 
be beaten . . . forty stripes he [the judge] may give 
him and not exceed lest if he should exceed and beat 
him above these with many stripes then thy brother 
should seem vile unto thee. [Deuteronomy 25:2-3] 
The principle derived is that if the Bible cautions so 
carefully against not "wounding" in excess for a convict, how 
much more so for an innocent person. It remains unclear, 
however, if the wounding would refer to the fetus or to the 
mother who is undergoing "unnecessary surgery" by having an 
abortion. 
4. Abortion as a Special Rabbinic Prohibition 
A fourth approach, finding no convincing precedent or 
analogy under which to include the prohibition of abortion, 
claims that it is forbidden by Rabbinical edict. This puts the 
prohibition in a different category: 
The dispute concerning the classification of the 
nature of the stricture against abortion is of more 
than mere speculative interest. It will be shown that 
various determinations regarding permissibility of 
therapeutic abortion in certain situations hinge 
directly upon proper categorization of this 
problem.35 
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That is, a Rabbinic edict which may be more easily 
suspended than a prohibition falling under some related but 
Biblical command. 
Viewing this discussion in Cordozo's terms, it seems that 
abortion is a prohibition in search of a precedent. Yet Bleich 
insists that our not knowing the nature of the prohibition "in 
no way mitigates the odius nature of the act." 
Section 3. Principles Derived from Other Branches of Law 
Feldman has written: 
A firm and direct legal basis in the classic sources 
has still not been discovered which would 
unequivocally label abortion on request as 
impermissible. Perhaps then evidence for the 
existence of at least an implied prohibition can be 
deduced from another area of Jewish law.37 
This section deals with such a broad method of analogy, 
where precedents are found in "distant" fields of the law and 
interpreted to yield very broad principles. 
A. Treatment of the Terminally Ill 
Jewish law is particularly strict with regards to rules 
pertaining to the end of life. One may not hasten the death of 
a terminally ill patient even if he is in pain and wishes to 
die.38 These rulings are often cited as evidence for 
establishing the absolute or infinite value of life in Jewish 
law. This seems a benign and quite a natural deduction from 
the precedent law on the terminally ill. Yet by our analysis 
the principle being abstracted is so broad as to be capable of 
multiple, very distinct meanings. What one means by "infinite 
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value" or "absolute" value becomes clear only in the kind of 
application of this principle that given authors will make. 
For the stringent orthodox position, we can apply this 
principle to the fetus and conclude that abortion is 
forbidden. Moreover, they deduce in particular that abortion 
for fetal indications is never justified because any life is 
infinitely and absolutely more valuable than no life. As we 
shall see later, many of these authors prohibit abortion even 
for the most serious genetic diseases. The principle of the 
absolute value of life thus ends up completely eliminating 
quality of life considerations from religious discourse. 
Referring to Tay-Sachs disease, Bleich states "It is well 
established that quality of life to be anticipated if the fetus 
is carried to term is not itself sufficient reason for the 
3 9 performance of abortion." 
We can object on two levels: First, to apply rules 
intended for a terminally ill adult to the fetus begs the whole 
question of the status or personhood of the fetus. Even if we 
accept that a terminally ill patient’s life has absolute or 
infinite value, what justifies extending this to the fetus? 
Second is that it is possible to understand the laws regarding 
terminally ill as a traditional concern with the weak and 
helpless, as measures to protect persons from neglect and abuse 
as Green has written. The tradition is then seen to have a 
great and abiding concern for all sorts of "quality of life" 
issues. When the tradition is rigorous "it is a rigor always 
in the service of understandable human values. 
40 
V. 
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B. The Special Role of Healing 
In discussing the special role that healing has in the 
Halakha, we are in a situation similar to the previous one. 
All authors agree on this broad principle, but in applying it 
we find they mean opposite things. Jakobovitz points out that 
Every religious system has recognized the inner 
conflict between the essentially divine and 
providential character of disease and the human 
efforts through medical treatment to mitigate or 
frustrate its effects.41 
In an attempt to resolve this dilemma, the Talmud in Bava 
Kamma 85a quotes the Bible: 
And if men quarrel with one another and one smiteth 
the other with a stone or with the fist and he does 
not die but keep his bed ... He must pay the loss 
entailed by absence from work and cause him to be 
thoroughly healed. [Exodus 21:18-19] 
The Talmud concludes from this that the physician is 
granted permission to cure. In a Midrashic source, the 
physician is compared to the farmer: 
Drugs and medicaments are the fertilizer and the 
physician is the tiller of soil. Just as if one does 
not weed fertilize and plow the trees will not produce 
fruit . . . but will die, so with regard to the 
body.42 
As Jakobovitz43 has pointed out, these passages represent 
quite distinct approaches to the dilemma of disease and divine 
will. In the first, the Talmud seeks specific authorization or 
dispensation allowing the physician to interfere in the disease 
process which is somehow divinely ordained. In the second 
passage, disease is seen as part of nature. Health, like 
wealth, is something man/woman is supposed to work at. No 
specific medical dispensation is needed. Both positions have 
been maintained throughout much of Halakhic history. 
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Bleich attempts an interesting synthesis of these views. 
He agrees with the analogy made in the latter Midrash but not 
because tilling the soil is an obvious instance of a natural 
right that man has. Rather, the opposite is true. The analogy 
views : 
therapeutic intervention as a contravention of divine 
will and application of medicaments as illicit 
interference with the natural processes of the human 
body which is the chattel of God. Indeed this is so, 
but by the same token fields and vineyards are the 
property of God as well and man has no natural right 
to till the soil or to pluck the fruits . . . Man may 
do so not as a matter of right but by virtue of 
specific divine dispensation. Man is similarly 
granted dispensation to practice the medical arts.44 
The specific dispensation which allows the tilling of the 
soil is "with the sweat of your brow shall you eat bread." 
[Genesis 3:19] This dispensation simultaneously gives man the 
right to struggle with Nature and instructs man not to rely on 
divine intervention for his sustenance or health. Bleich seems 
to be saying that everything that isn't specifically allowed is 
prohibited. We will argue later that, in fact, this belief 
does inform his and other stringent orthodox authors' approach 
to Jewish law. 
There are a multitude of other Biblical, Talmudic and other 
45 
Halakhic references to the special nature of healing For 
our discussion, what is important is the application of the 
principle that healing is permitted, in fact required by Jewish 
law. 
As we have seen, the stringent orthodox camp actually uses 
this principle to restrict abortion to life threatening 
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situations. Medical need becomes a very tightly defined 
concept which never gets extended to other sorts of need or 
quality of life considerations. 
The more lenient camp might argue that this is a distortion 
of a life-giving principle intended for the promotion of the 
well being of individuals. That, furthermore, quality of life 
issues are not excluded but implied by the Halakhic view of 
healing. The dispensation or command to heal, to actively 
intervene with natural and divine forces can also be used as a 
precedent for allowing abortion. To argue, as many have, that 
every pregnancy is God's will and a blessing, is simply 
inconsistent with the meaning of these principles concerning 
man's proper attitude towards nature and providence. 
C. The Centrality of Procreation 
In considering the role of medical healing or the treatment 
of the terminally ill the stringent camp has extracted a 
principle that sets the preservation of life over any 
4 6 
considerations of its quality. As Lubarsky has pointed 
out, to this camp the laws describing procreative obligations 
will be understood as instances of the same principles, or 
similar ones. Namely, that increasing life, as well as 
preserving already extant life is a central obligation. 
Moreover, the increase of life takes priority over its 
quality. That this is the intent of the stringent position can 
be seen in the following: 
Purely social or economic reasons, let alone 
considerations of sheer convenience, would never be 
regarded as valid indication for the artificial 
of 
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frustration of the act and duty of procreation. For 
legal purposes, i.e. to override or modify religious 
law, Judaism would therefore not unreservedly accept 
the World Health Organization definition of health as 
a state of physical, mental and social well being. 
While it naturally seeks to promote the social health 
of society and its members by numerous laws and 
enactments designed to advance human welfare, social 
and economic considerations by themselves do not 
automatically suspend religious or moral imperative in 
the same way as purely medical factors do.4' 
The diverse laws concerning medical healing, treatment of 
the terminally ill, procreation, contraception and abortion are 
all understood by the stringent camp as indicating the selfsame 
principle that an increase in the quantity of life is a central 
value and takes priority over quality of life or even over 
other religious obligations. Moreover, for this principle at 
least, all forms of human life are equivalent. We shall return 
to these points later in this chapter. 
D. A Consistent and Systematic Bias 
In the last two sections, we cited many of the numerous 
sources and cases which are used as precedents for the abortion 
discussion in the Halakha. Some have dealt directly with 
abortion, others have been in quite distinct areas of Jewish 
law. We have tried to indicate that in every instance there 
are alternative ways to draw principles directly relevant to 
abortion from these materials. The stringent camp has, we 
believe, systematically rejected all of the lenient 
implications for abortion that is inherent in so many of these 
precedents, and has consistently forced a restrictive principle 
out of these materials. In the next section, we will discuss a 
possible source of bias in the underlying belief system of this 
camp. 
' 
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Section 4. Theological and Philosophical Assumptions 
We would like to locate at least part of the source of bias 
discussed above in underlying assumptions, beliefs and 
attitudes. These are the forces, as Cordozo writes, "which, 
when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice 
4 8 
will fall." ° 
Lubarsky has referred to what she calls "extra Halakhic 
principles . . . which are preestablished ethical perspectives 
4 9 
which are then validated by seeking corroborative texts." 
These then are the philosophical and theological assumptions 
which one brings to the reading of a text or adjudication of a 
case. It is especially important to excavate these in the case 
of the stringent orthodox authors because of their repeated 
insistence that such philosophical categories are not involved 
in their exegesis. 
Lubarsky50 and Green51 have discussed the "assumptions" 
or "bases" upon which they feel the stringent camp is 
grounded. We would like to take this analysis a little further 
and find philosophical and theological presuppositions which 
are deeply imbedded and not clearly articulated. We believe 
that a fundamental disagreement about these basic categories is 
responsible for the difficulty of creating a dialogue across 
the differing sides in the abortion discussion even within 
Jewish thought. What is lacking is a common language at this 
level. We agree with Cordozo's comment that these assumptions 
are often subconscious - not in the psychoanalytic sense, but 
in the "breathing" sense that they are taken for granted and 
not examined. 
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A. The Meaning and Value of Life 
Much of the debate about abortion involves comparisons 
between the fetus and an adult person. The arguments often 
turn on defining the "essential" properties of being an adult 
person and showing that the fetus does or does not share these 
essential properties and is therefore entitled or not to 
certain kinds of treatment. Phrases such as "sanctity of 
life," "absolute value of life," or "infinite value of life" 
must be understood in the context of what they mean vis-a-vis 
an adult person before we can apply them to the fetus. Indeed, 
this is why the abortion debate is often so difficult. It 
requires us to question what we mean by the "value of life" and 
forces us to question the worth and meaning of our existence. 
The philosopher Paul Edwards, basing his discussion on the 
work of Kurt Baier, distinguishes two senses in which people 
use the phrase "meaning and value of life." One sense he calls 
the "cosmic" sense. This refers to belief in a "superhuman 
intelligence that has fashioned human beings to . . . serve 
, ..52 
some end. 
A specific example of this "cosmic" sense is also referred 
to by the Jewish theologian Emile Fackenheim: 
Whatever meaning life acquires is derived from the 
encounter between God and man. The meaning thus 
conferred upon human life cannot be understood in 
terms of some finite human purpose supposedly more 
ultimate than the meeting itself. For what could be 
more ultimate than the presence of God?53 
The other sense in which Edwards discusses the meaning and 
value of life he calls the "terrestrial": 
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. . . not concerned with cosmic issues but with the 
question whether certain purposes are to be found in 
[sic] this life. Thus most of us would say without 
hesitation that a person's life had meaning if we knew 
that he devoted himself to a cause [for example] . . . 
He will justify his devotion in terms of the 
production of happiness and the reduction of suffering 
. . . It is sufficient that he should have some [such] 
attachments.54 
In both the senses mentioned by Edwards, the value and 
meaning of life is related to some goal, be it human and 
terrestrial or divine and cosmic. It is what happens within a 
life that gives it value. Another way of viewing this is to 
understand references to life as the context or container, the 
prerequisite condition for other values. Life in this sense 
has a primary value, but that value proceeds from other 
values. Yet this analysis is not complete. Even the "cosmic" 
sense of the value of life fails to capture what the stringent 
orthodox mean by "absolute value of life" or the "sanctity of 
life." These phrases, as used in the abortion discussion, seem 
to refer to something intrinsic, not dependent on goals, even 
religious, "cosmic" goals. 
The philosopher Martin Golding confirms our need for 
another category of value without being able to supply it, when 
he writes: 
It is difficult, of course, to think of life as an 
aspirational value ... I suggest that another kind 
of gradation is needed to reflect the view of the 
tradition. Perhaps a gradation of supremacy. It is a 
fundamental Halakhic principle that regard for 
imperiled life suspends the whole Torah . . . The 
value of human lives then cannot be expressed merely 
in terms of the strength of the prohibition against 
taking life. This value has supremacy that goes 
beyond its being a condition for the realization of 
higher values.^ 
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We would like to propose that when many stringent orthodox 
authors refer to the "value" of life, they are often speaking 
of "life" not as man's existence but as God’s property. The 
central image is that life belongs to God and must therefore be 
safeguarded. Whatever values man may find within his life, the 
life itself is never his. Yet, as God's property, it must be 
treated as an "infinite" and "absolute" value. Notice that in 
this sense the value of life is independent of the quality of 
life, and that in this sense also, all human lives are of equal 
value. 
The philosopher Stephen Dixon has made reference to the 
same idea, although he locates it in the Old Testament. 
Whatever belongs to God is sacred by definition 
because and only because it belongs to him. Therefore 
sanctity in the Biblical sense of the word should not 
be used either to designate that which unites all 
. . . persons, nor as a designator for humane 
treatment of all living things. Life was considered 
God's property and he was free to do with it as he 
willed. "I kill and I make alive; I wound and I 
heal." [Deuteronomy 32:39] . . . Rights and sanctity 
of life are foreign to each other.5° 
With this as background, we suggest that the underlying 
philosophical and theological assumptions of the stringent 
orthodox position are rooted in a dual notion of the nature of 
human life. First, human life belonging to God has intrinsic 
value which is independent of man's experience. Man's first 
duty, then, is to treasure and safeguard life which has been 
entrusted to him. This takes precedent over almost every other 
duty. There is a tendency, given this belief, to equate human 
life with physiological survival. For, if man's experience of 
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his life does not in the first place determine the worth of 
that life, neither can it determine whether life is present or 
absent. Thus, in being rigorous, one must safeguard all human 
life. It may, at first, seem paradoxical that such a strongly 
theological view leads to so concrete a definition of life, nor 
is it clear that this is logically necessary, but it seems that 
these ideas are often linked. It also follows immediately that 
we cannot at this level of life’s value draw distinctions 
between different lives. All share this form of "value" 
equally. 
Second, life is also understood to have value as a context 
for fulfillment of religious duties. It has value in Edwards' 
"cosmic sense” as the stage for the encounter between man and 
God. It seems, however, that to the stringent orthodox 
position this encounter is defined by religious duty and only 
this duty has value. Religious laws are obligatory regardless 
of their consequences for human welfare. In fact, religious 
duties define that welfare. When conflicts arise between 
quality of life and religious duty, they are resolved in favor 
of the religious duty. The scheme is extremely simplified yet 
it has a good deal of explanatory power, as we shall see in the 
next subsection. 
B. Consequences of the Assumptions 
Jakobovitz has written with regard to disallowing 
euthanasia that every human life has "infinite value. Infinity 
by definition is indispensable so that any fraction of life 
whether ten years or a minute, whether healthy, crippled or 
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even unconscious remains equally infinite in value."57 We 
can understand Jakobovitz's comment in the context of our 
scheme. A terminally ill conscious person may choose not to 
attach any value to his life in Edward’s terrestrial sense. 
Nevertheless, his life has value in the cosmic sense. As 
Halibord comments, "survival here [need] include conscious 
rational life of only a few seconds sufficient to enable him to 
5 8 
repent." Thus, regardless of a person’s valuation of his 
life, as long as there is a possibility of conscious rational 
thought, there is infinite value to his life as a context for 
this encounter with God. Notice also that as long as a person 
is capable of this encounter his life, regardless of its pain 
or potential duration, is of equal worth to any other person's 
since it is only these encounters that are of real value to 
begin with. Yet Jakobovitz is saying more than this and 
includes the terminally unconscious patient’s life as also of 
infinite value. To understand this, we must draw on our first 
assumption and understand that even such a mere physiological 
survival is, according to this view, of infinite value because 
it is God’s. There may be dispensation for man to take 
responsibility for his own fields and health, but one can never 
take over the responsibility of one's life or its end. 
Consider now the concept of murder. It can be understood 
in our scheme as a crime on three levels. At the most obvious 
level it is a crime against the victim; on a second level it 
represents a destruction of a context for worship; lastly, it 
is a diminution of life, God's property. Abortion, by 
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comparison, probably cannot be seen as similar to murder at the 
first level. However, it remains a crime on the third level. 
Certainly feticide is a diminution of human physiological life 
and as such is exclusively God’s prerogative. Thus, even if 
one agrees that the fetus is not a person, in the sense that 
feticide is not a crime against any one, it is still a crime 
against God. Steinberg has written: 
Human life is of the utmost value in Jewish philosophy 
and law. This basic viewpoint is transferred to fetal 
life as well, therefore abortion is fundamentally 
forbidden.59 
We consider next the ruling that when life is in peril all 
religious laws are suspended. According to our scheme, we 
should expect to find two reasons for this suspension of 
religious law. First, life as God's property has a special 
value which takes priority over other religious duty, e.g. the 
Sabbath. For our first religious duty is to preserve and 
increase life. Second, seen as a context for fulfilling other 
religious duties, the preservation of the context naturally 
takes priority. 
Without explaining the reason Halibord has noted that the 
Talmud in Yoma 85a in fact does give two distinct reasons why 
the Sabbath may be desecrated to save a life: 
The first is that it is logical to profane one Sabbath 
to save a life so that he can keep [observe] other 
Sabbaths. The second is a deduction from the verse.60 
The verse reads "... Thou shall live by them [the laws]" 
[Leviticus 18:5] and we deduce that life takes priority over 
The first reason given by Halibord is other religious laws. 
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precisely what we expected when considering life a context for 
worship. The deduction from the passage may also parallel our 
notion of life as God's prerogative. Recall that the 
exceptions to this rule are the circumstances in which one must 
lose one's life rather than transgress: idolatry, murder and 
incest. Each of these can be seen to destroy the possibility 
of life being a context for worship or encounter with God. The 
point we wish to stress is that danger to life is a special 
category because of the nature of the value of life. 
It also becomes clear why danger to maternal life also 
constitutes a special and unique circumstance under which 
abortion is permitted. The conflict here is between the 
mother's life and the fetal life. The mother's life takes 
precedent over fetal life because her life is valued both for 
being God’s and in the sense of a context of worship. The 
fetus' has only the former sort of value. Notice however that 
the life of the fetus does have priority over any other 
religious law, e.g. we violate the Sabbath for it. By 
extension, its life has precedent over any other "terrestrial" 
value as well. 
We can now understand why the stringent position cannot 
extend the permissive criteria for abortion from maternal 
health to other more general forms of maternal well being as 
the more lenient camps have advocated. Peril to life and 
medical intervention are categories that depend on the very 
nature of the value of life. One cannot extend these 
categories. In our scheme, it makes no sense to argue that if 
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a woman's health is sufficient cause for abortion then so is 
economic or other need. As Bleich remarks, "Grave need is not 
a health problem."61 Similarly Rosner comments, "Why is her 
convenience more valuable than a potential life?"62 
We can also better understand a more difficult position 
taken by the stringent orthodox camp. The ruling that fetal 
indications never in themselves justify an abortion. Thus 
Jakobovitz: 
This prohibition against abortion would stand even if 
it were certain that the child would be born deformed 
just as it is forbidden to kill a crippled person.6^ 
Similarly, Bleich: 
It is well established that quality of life to be 
anticipated if the fetus is carried to term is not 
itself sufficient reason for the performance of an 
abortion. The status of abnormal and deformed human 
beings is well defined in Halakha. Physical or mental 
abnormality do not affect the human status of the 
individual. 
And Rosner: 
To eliminate Tay-Sachs disease by selective abortion 
is unacceptable in traditional Judaism. Recourse to 
abortion in circumstances where the unborn fetus is 
determined to have Tay-Sachs disease is not 
permissible in Jewish law.65 
Fetal indications do not suffice to allow for an abortion. 
Since the only truly important values are those having to do 
with religious duty and the encounter with God. Any living 
person who can participate to whatever extent in this encounter 
has a life context as valuable as anyone else. Just as we may 
not distinguish between two adults on the basis of deformity so 
may we not distinguish between fetuses on this basis. Finally, 
even if it were to be determined that the fetus would never 
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have consciousness, never have a life, that is, that would be 
called a context for worship. Its life is still something 
belonging to God and must be protected. 
C. Summary 
In this section we have presented a '’possible'* set of basic 
philosophical-theological beliefs that could in part account 
for the systematic bias seen in the stringent orthodox 
interpretation of abortion Halakha. We do not underestimate 
the difficulty in determining what someone else's 
unacknowledged biases are. Nor are we in any way advocating 
that these philosophical-theological assumptions are somehow 
"authentic" to the Jewish tradition. On the contrary, we see 
these assumptions as extra-Ha1akhic and as limiting the 
interpretation of Halakha along one narrow path. If Cordozo is 
correct, however, one must have some predetermined attitudes 
and be biased in some direction. We prefer a different set of 
biases as we shall discuss in the concluding chapter. 
Section 5. The Method of Sociology - The Halakhist as 
Leais1ator 
In addition to the philosophical-theological 
presuppositions the views of the restrictive camp have also 
been influenced by certain agenda which we feel are outside of 
the Halakhic framework, but whose influence contributes to the 
particular bias of this camp. We will discuss a few of these 
issues very briefly. 
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A♦ The Slippery Slope 
Bleich states: "It is instructive to note that 
historically societies that condoned abortion invariably 
practiced infanticide as well."^ Similarly, Carmy writes, 
"No defense of abortion on demand has been produced that would 
,,67 And Rosner fears fail to justify infanticide as well. 
that if we allow abortion ". . . will legal infanticide 
6 8 follow? Legal euthanasia? Legal genocide?" 
The principle of a "slippery slope” or "edge of the wedge" 
is well known in Halakha where it is called qeder - fence. One 
puts up legal fences, forbidding actions that are not 
necessarily wrong in themselves, to protect very cherished 
laws. Yet in regards to feticide recall that the Mishna 
concerning the difficult labor draws a clear distinction 
between fetus and infant, between the moment before birth and 
the moment after. Perhaps in its wisdom, the Mishna felt that 
this boundary was so basic that there was no danger of having 
it crossed. 
B. Response to Genocide 
The emotional reference to the Holocaust in the previous 
quote by Rosner is a very common occurrence in the contemporary 
literature on abortion and is especially poignant in the Jewish 
literature. The reference to the Holocaust is made in two 
different arguments. The first argument is related to the 
slippery slope. The Holocaust is taken as evidence or a 
warning concerning the loss of reverence for life in the 20th 
Every act that can be construed as lacking in that century. 
V 
95 
reverence leads us into dangerous waters. In addition, these 
arguments usually make reference to a concern about eugenics 
and abortion being used for such ends. Although there is 
certainly some merit in many of these arguments, the particular 
reference to the Holocaust has more emotional appeal than 
logical force. Jewish authors, in particular, need to be very 
sensitive not to misuse such references to win emotional 
support for their arguments. 
A second argument making reference to the Holocaust is made 
with respect to a perceived need for the Jewish people to 
"replenish the calamitous losses sustained in the Nazi 
Holocaust with the destruction of one third of [the Jewish] 
6 9 people." It is beyond the scope of this paper to enter 
into the complex discussion of demographic ethics. We would 
merely note that it is unclear how increasing the Jewish 
population in any way "replenishes" the loss or responds to the 
pain of the Holocaust. Clearly this is not the only or even 
the most sensitive response and certainly it has little to do 
with the Halakhic view of abortion. Sensitivity to the issue 
of the Holocaust requires that it not be used indiscriminately 
to stir emotional response where it is not logically relevant. 
C. Institutional Considerations 
Green and Sinclair have argued that the most restrictive 
orthodox view: 
... is traceable to the desire on the part of many 
orthodox scholars to demonstrate that on matters of 
sexual and moral concern Judaism is no less stringent 
and no less rigorous in its views than are the most 
conservative Catholic or Protestant teachings. 
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Moreover, Green argues that the strictest orthodox position 
may have arisen from an institutional need to distinguish a 
stance that represents a sign of contradiction to the more 
liberal attitudes in Judaism. This leads to interpreting the 
Halakha with a distinct anti-modern perspective. 
Feldman has made a similar observation: 
. . . contemporary Rabbis evoke not the more lenient 
but the more stringent responsa of the earlier 
authorities. The more permissive decisions they point 
out were in any case rendered against the background 
of greater instinctual hesitation to resort to 
abortion. Against today's background of more casual 
abortion Rabbis are moving closer to the position 
associated with Maimonides and Unterman allowing 
abortion only for the gravest of reasons. 
If these institutional considerations are indeed at work it 
would be most unfortunate. In an attempt to demonstrate that 
Halakha can be just as stringent as other denominations, we 
would lose what was special about Halakha. We would lose what 
we began this paper with, as MacIntyre wrote, "a clear 
statement of what difference it makes to be a Jew or Christian 
72 
or a Moslem . . . or a secular thinker.” In an attempt to 
define sectarian institutional boundaries and turfs, we also 
lose the unique perspectives of the Halakha on important 
issues. The Halakha is neither conservative nor liberal, but 
has its own complex views gained over centuries which often 
surprises those who are honest enough to read it with open eyes. 
^ . 
Chapter VII 
Conclusion 
Throughout this paper we have concentrated on a critique of 
the stringent orthodox position. We have been interested in 
refuting the correlation claim and simultaneously in 
understanding the source and structure of the stringent 
orthodox position, both from its own view and from a more 
critical perspective. In the process, we have come to 
understand how important a role legalistic thinking plays for 
this particular position. We introduced a critical legal 
framework for demonstrating the complexity in any so-called 
purely legalistic methodology and demonstrated how systematic 
bias and non-Halakhic assumption and goals have contributed to 
the actual formulation of this camp's positions. We have shown 
that there has been not a single but multiple authentic 
Halakhic views on abortion for fifteen centuries and there are 
authentic "descendents" of the more permissive school of 
thought active today. We can no longer speak about the Jewish 
position on abortion. Rather, we must refer to the Halakhic 
"debate," "dialogue" or "discussion" on abortion. 
In concluding, we would like to recall two important 
questions that were raised in the Introduction: 1) What are 
the issues and methods of discourse that are important in the 
Halakhic discussion of abortion; 2) What contribution can this 
Halakhic discussion make to the contemporary debate on 
, 
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abortion. In this chapter, we will discuss how our results 
reflect on these questions. 
Section 1: The Correlation Claim Revisited 
We have shown that the correlation claim does not hold up 
under careful scrutiny. Abortion is unlike many simpler 
religious issues in which the Halakha is clear. In those 
instances, perhaps the rigoristic position can rightfully claim 
that its stance is based on strict adherence to the letter of 
the Halakha. No single simple formulation, however, can cover 
the complexity of the abortion issue and the Halakha reflects 
this truth by preserving multiple views on abortion. The 
Halakha reflects the differences of opinion that have always 
accompanied the issue even within its own strictly religious 
borders. 
Stienberg is incorrect in his assessment that "the overall 
Jewish perspective is anti-abortion."^ Brickner is equally 
wrong in claiming that, "Jewish law agrees with the Supreme 
2 
Court . . . Judaism permits abortion." Rather the Halakha 
has preserved a debate between a somewhat restrictive and a 
more permissive position. The Halakha continues to struggle 
with this issue today as it has for centuries. A position more 
lenient than the stringent orthodox position has begun to 
emerge in the English language literature as we have seen. 
This position can find an "ancestry" in the Halakha as can the 
stringent position. Yet neither reflects the total view of the 
Halakha in this issue. 
I 
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The fact that the Halakha has preserved for millenia a 
legitimately religious school of thought that was permissive 
with regard to abortion is of significance to the larger 
contemporary debate on abortion. The claim is often put 
forward by those opposed to abortion that the Judeo-Christian 
tradition is likewise fundamentally opposed to abortion, and 
that this opposition has always been a basic tenent of western 
monotheism. An attempt is made to identify the anti-abortion 
position with a religious or Godly outlook while identifying 
the more permissive positions with secularism and -modernism." 
This argument is analogous to the correlation claim in that it 
correlates being "truly" religious with being anti-abortion. 
We can call it the general correlation claim. 
The long history of a permissive school of thought on 
abortion within Halakhic Judaism puts these claims in doubt. 
Since reasonable religious scholars have disagreed about 
abortions and the status of the fetus, there is clearly nothing 
about the fundamentals of the Judeo-Christian belief system 
that makes it necessarily opposed to abortion. This result is 
not very widely understood and still surprises many scholars 
and researchers. In a study on religion and opposition to 
abortion, A. Lewis Rhodes, surveying college freshmen, found a 
correlation between religious preferences, attendance at 
3 
religious services, and opposition to abortion. Rhodes 
finds that 62 percent of Mormons and 60 percent of Roman 
Catholics opposed legalized abortion while only 6 percent of 
Unitarians and 12 percent of Jews oppose legalization. Rhodes 
in an attempt to explain these latter results states: 
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Assuming that religion is a basic force in 
formation of a world view, one might 
attribute the pro-abortion attitudes of 
Unitarians, Jews, Quakers or Episcopalians to 
a cosmopolitan tolerance and humanistic 
respect for individual choice. Such 
tolerance and humanism may be reinforced by 
concentration of such religious members in 
the most liberal region in the United States, 
the East. Also, the mothers of subjects in 
these religions are better educated."4 
Rhodes explains the results for Jews, Unitarians and 
Quakers be referring to factors outside religious beliefs. He 
does not consider the possibility that it may be a religious 
choice to be pro-legalized abortion. This is not uncommon, 
people who are permissive with regard to abortion rarely 
realize that there is a religious precedent for this stance. 
Perhaps this indicates how widely the general correlation claim 
is accepted, and how religious concepts have often been 
misrepresented by forces opposed to legalized abortion. A 
major contribution that Halakha could thus make to the abortion 
debate is to force all of us to re-examine our often simplistic 
assumption about religion in relation to the abortion issue. 
Section 2: The Mother's Life Takes Precedence 
In speaking of "multiple authentic" Halakhic views on 
abortion, we do not intent to give the impression that any 
position can find Halakhic precedent. There are definite 
limits to the spectrum of acceptable views. In particular all 
Jewish scholars currently agree and have agreed for fifteen 
centuries that the life of the mother takes precedence over the 
fetus. Given the status of women during most of these 
* 
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centuries, this is a significant ruling. The mother is clearly 
to be treated as an individual. Her role as childbearer is 
secondary, her actual life takes precedence over the fetus's 
potential life. 
This ruling differed with the Catholic position for many 
centuries. Yet the importance of this distinction has been 
under-appreciated by Jews and Gentiles alike. Even for those 
stringent Orthodox Jews, authors who would permit abortion only 
to save the life of the mother, this ruling is still different 
in important ways from the Catholic position. This difference 
represents the Halakhic contribution to ethical thought on this 
issue. It is therefore important that these differences be 
more widely appreciated. Moreover, it is difficult to 
understand the rationale of certain stringent orthodox authors 
who have aligned themselves with the Catholic church to fight 
5 
against abortion. This is certainly not the "authentic" 
Jewish position, and it undermines the distinctive contribution 
that the Halaka can make to the debate; namely that it does 
differ from the Catholic position in an important way, and that 
the mother's life always takes precedent over a fetus. 
Section 3: The Lenient Halakhic Position 
We have already made many references to the contemporary 
lenient Halakhic position on abortion. We have argued that 
this position can certainly find authentic "ancestry" within 
the traditional Halakha. From our vantage point, we recognize 
that it is one of the continuous voices preserved by the 
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Halakha in each of its epochs. We will here briefly describe 
this position in light of our analysis. 
Representatives of this position include Green^, 
7 8 Greenberg, Biale, and others. While recognizing the 
seriousness of every decision to abort a pregnancy, this 
position would allow abortion for severe fatal indications and 
for maternal consideration such as social, economic and family 
planning issues. Along these lines, Greenberg has asked, "How 
can we retain the principles of reverence for life which are 
built into the Halakha while yet widening the ground for 
9 
abortion." 
This position recognizes the same elements in Halakha but 
tends to interpret them in understandable human terms. As 
Green explains it, even when the tradition has been harsh, it 
is "a rigor in the service of understandable human 
values."10 There is a greater sense of a conventional 
relationship with God rather than an authoritarian 
relationship. Thus its approach to Halakha assumes that the 
tradition is concerned with the well being of persons and the 
quality of their lives. There is a "humanistic intentionality 
to many of the fundamental teachings."11 The special mandate 
for healing the Halakha is taken as evidence for its overall 
concern with the experiences of persons and the quality of 
their lives. Procreation is viewed as only one part of the 
Halakhic mandate concerning the loving and sexual nature of 
marriage. The rules concerning the terminally will are seen as 
affording protection to the weak rather than forcing the 
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continuation of pain. In Green's words, these laws "were 
• • • 12 
elaborated initially to protect human beings from cruelty." 
If we examine the basic beliefs of this position concerning 
the nature of Halakha we find that there is again a strong 
interdependence between the belief structure and the method of 
interpreting Halakha. The exigetical approach of these authors 
falls under Cordoza’s heading "The Method of History." We 
might call it a contextual moral analysis. It involves a 
sensitivity to the context in which a ruling was made. The 
focus is placed on the moral dilemma faced by the Halakha given 
the existing set of social and historical conditions. The 
principles they abstract from these precedents derive from how 
the moral dilemma is resolved. For example, in the case of the 
condemned woman, the Halakhic principle extracted does not 
involve capital punishment nor does it concern the father's 
property rights to his wife’s fetus. These elements of the 
case are not in question. They are the given social context. 
We must accept them to understand the moral dilemma under 
consideration. In this case, the dilemma is whether a 
condemned mother's comfort outweighs the father's right to the 
fetus and the life of the fetus itself. As we have seen, the 
talmud rules that it does. This approach avoids simply 
applying rules whose original context and meaning have 
changed. This position, for example, would warn us to be 
"sensitive to the radical new situations medical technology has 
..13 
created. 
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We find this position very attractive. It does not ask us 
to reject Halakha or even to change it nor does it blindly 
apply rules elaborated in completely different social 
contexts. Rather it preserves the ethical core of Halakhic 
decisions and attempts to apply them in the contemporary 
context. 
A prominent aspect of context in which the Halakha has been 
established has been the dominant role of men in the social, 
economic and religious arenas. It seems fair to assume that 
since all the Halakhic decision makers have been men, Cordozo 
would have predicted a source of systematic bias in this 
group's rulings. We would especially expect this to be true 
with regard to abortion issue that affects women so much more 
immediately than it does men. In this regard, we have seen 
that the Halakha often stresses the individuality of the mother 
and the predominance of her life and interest over that of her 
role as childbearer. We can clearly see in these ruling the 
traditional tendency to protect the weak, in this case woman, 
from abuse. Yet the role of woman within the Halakha has often 
been secondary to that of men. We are just now beginning to 
see the emergence of a feminist critique of Halakha in general 
and on the abortion question in particular. The introduction 
of knowledgable women Halakhists into the discussion on 
abortion will not only eliminate the male sources of systematic 
bias, but open fresh perspectives on the traditional rulings. 
As Rachel Biale writes: 
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The Halakha as it is presently constituted 
does not accept women as equal to men despite 
orthodox apologies to the contrary. But even 
as we reject the traditional view of woman in 
favor of equality, we need not reject the 
Halakhic framework. We must revolutionize 
the view of woman within the Halakha but that 
very process will necessarily revolutionize 
the Halakha itself.14 
The lenient Halakhic position and its newest sector, the 
feminist Halakhic position, are involved in the struggle to 
maintain the ethical core of the tradition while recognizing 
the uniqueness of the contemporary context. These authors have 
recognized the need to balance an awareness of contemporary 
circumstances with a deep trust for the ethical insights of the 
past as preserved in the tradition. The formulations that have 
and will emerge from this synthesis serve as a model for how 
the larger abortion debate might begin to resolve its dual 
attachments to past mores and present social realities. 
Section 4: The Underlying Belief Systems 
With the help of Cardozo's framework, we have been able to 
examine the stringent coup's method of interpreting the 
Halakhic precedents concerning abortion. We were able to 
demonstrate a consistent and systematic bias in those 
interpretations. In the last chapter, we attempted to 
formulate one possible set of underlying beliefs and goals that 
would account for this bias. An important result from this 
analysis was the realization that the debate within the Halakha 
resolved around conflicting philosophica1-theologica1 beliefs 
What sometimes appeared to be argumentation and social goals. 
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based on proof text citation and quoting authority is in fact a 
deeply ideological discourse involving fundamental belief 
structures. These underlying beliefs are not always 
acknowledged, however. As an example, we have seen how complex 
the notion of the "sanctity of life" is, and the fact that is 
used by different groups to refer to fundamentally different 
belief systems. 
There is an important lesson in this for the larger debate 
on abortion. It is the recognition that what appear to be the 
issues under discussion may not in fact be the real issues that 
motivate the various positions. To discover these and make 
them manifest, we must first notice the biases or blind spots 
of a particular position and then attempt to reconstruct what 
the source of this bias is in terms of philosophical- 
theological beliefs, social goals, etc. The major obstacle to 
better communication between the various parties to this debate 
is the fact that what is really at issue is often left unsaid 
and unacknowledged as each side takes these assumptions for 
granted. For example, what appears to be a discussion about 
the nature and status of the fetus may turn out in reality to 
be about sexuality, the meaning of family, the role of woman in 
society, or God's perogative over life and death The better 
we understand the real sources of the various opinions and 
their biases, the better we will be able to make truly ethical 
and informed choices. 
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Section 5: Afterword: The Halakha 
We will close with a few thoughts on the Halakhic process. 
Rachel Biale writes: 
In order to understand what puzzle and 
concerns us in the present, we must turn to 
the past even though it may at first be more 
confusing, obscure and alien than our 
present. 
Perhaps the nature of the Halakha is that it does not in 
and of itself contain a broad ethical framework. Instead, it 
forces a dialogue between the present and the past by recording 
and preserving in concrete cases what was done in the past. 
The Halakha recognizes that as situations change and new moral 
dilemmas arise, what we need most is to be grounded in the 
past, what we need most is continuity. Ethical systems do not 
serve this purpose, they are too easily re-interpreted; 
abstraction begets further abstraction. 
Instead, the ethics of the Halakha are contained in 
concrete acts governed by concrete case laws. Within these 
fixed points of law we are free to speculate on ethical systems 
that fit within this frame. The Halakha supplies the boundary 
points for an ethical system. We must supply and resupply the 
system that fits these boundary points. What is essential is 
the process, we are forced into a dialogue with our past and it 
is this dialogue that keeps us ethical and keeps us anchored. 
The word "Halakha” is derived from the Hebrew word for "The 
Way." We often think of a "way” or path as being laid out in 
front of us. The Halakha reminds us that we have traveled 
along The Way already and it is also laid out behind us. We 
must keep contact with that past as we move forward. 
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